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INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is based on a layered, end-to-end model that 
allows people at each level of the network to innovate free of any 
central control.  By placing intelligence at the edges rather than 
control in the middle of the network, the Internet has created a 
platform for innovation. 
—Vinton Cerf1 
Over the past five years, social networking sites such as 
Facebook,2 Google,3 and Twitter4 have changed the way people 
use the Internet and interact with each other.  These websites serve 
as a platform for people to connect with other users of the site and 
share information, pictures, and, increasingly, their real-time 
location.  The explosive growth of sites such as Facebook and 
MySpace has spawned a second generation of social networks.  
Second generation social networks push the privacy envelope even 
further than initial experiments in information sharing by 
encouraging users to share a catalogue of their possessions, address 
books, and real-time purchases.  Correspondingly, the ever-
increasing amount of personal information divulged via these sites 
has had, and will continue to have, dramatic implications for the 
social networking sites, their users, and the law.  Federal courts, 
 
 1 Letter from Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google, 
Inc., to Hon. Joe Barton, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, and Hon. 
John D. Dingell, Ranking Member, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Nov. 8, 
2005), available at http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/11/vint-cerf-speaks-out-on-net-
neutrality.html. 
 2 Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
 3 Google, http://www.google.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
 4 Twitter, http://www.twitter.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
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Congress, and the industry itself will be making difficult and 
complicated decisions in the near term about how to protect users 
of social networking sites from the misuse of information that they 
have provided on a social network.  Several recent controversies 
over a social network’s use of personal information have the 
potential of spurring Congress to enact comprehensive privacy law 
reform, limiting the amount and use of information available to 
social networks.5 
For decades, artists, politicians, and ordinary people alike have 
fretted over the United States government wiretapping their phones 
and tracking their movements by satellite and other “creepy” 
mechanisms of government surveillance.6  Indeed, in George 
Orwell’s classic, 1984, government surveillance was central to 
creating the terrifying persona of Big Brother.7  The recent 
revelation by author Matthew M. Aid that the National Security 
Agency (“NSA”) is constructing a storage site to catalog quotidian 
email conversations between American citizens only serves to 
substantiate those anxieties.8  Even in the private sector, these 
 
 5 See discussion infra Part I.A.4. 
 6 See, e.g., Jeremy Redmon, Cameras May Police City Streets, ATLANTA J.-CONST., 
Oct. 26, 2009, at A1 (“‘It’s kind of creepy,’ said Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of 
the Washington-based Electronic Privacy Information Center. ‘Mass surveillance is 
essentially directed toward everyone, so it doesn’t matter if you are someone planning a 
crime or if you are a resident or tourist or someone who is walking into an office building 
to go to work. Everyone gets swept into these big databases.’”). 
 7 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Thomas Pynchon ed., Penguin Books 2003) (1949). 
 8 See MATTHEW M. AID, THE SECRET SENTRY: THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 286–309 (2009); see also James Bamford, Who’s in Big 
Brother’s Database?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/ 
articles/23231 (describing the construction of a NSA facility that is designed to hold at 
least “a septillion pages of text”).   
On a remote edge of Utah’s dry and arid high desert, where 
temperatures often zoom past 100 degrees, hard-hatted construction 
workers with top-secret clearances are preparing to build what may 
become America’s equivalent of Jorge Luis Borges’s “Library of 
Babel,” . . . .  
. . . It’s being built by the ultra-secret National Security Agency—
which is primarily responsible for “signals intelligence,” the 
collection and analysis of various forms of communication—to house 
trillions of phone calls, e-mail messages, and data trails: Web 
searches, parking receipts, bookstore visits, and other digital “pocket 
litter.” 
Bamford, supra.  
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concerns have long been a focal point of anxiety in futuristic 
interpretations of our society.  In Minority Report, for example, the 
character played by Tom Cruise receives advertisements projected 
onto his eyes based on where he is at the moment.9  The eerie 
music and dark, ominous atmosphere suggest that if society ever 
reaches that point, doom is surely just around the corner. 
Recent developments in location-based social networking 
applications10 bring the American populace far closer to location-
specific advertising than ever before and are forcing Americans, 
courts, and Congress to reimagine and redefine privacy rights and 
expectations.  With applications like Loopt,11 Foursquare,12 and 
any of the thousands of applications available on the iPhone, the 
Internet community is ironically creating, using, and exploring the 
very surveillance and lack of privacy that the general population 
feared for so long.  The potential for aggregating personally 
identifiable information (“PII”) across a dizzying array of start-up 
social networks has the potential of completely erasing the idea of 
privacy and anonymity on the Internet.  Second generation start-up 
social networks allow users to share a pattern of their locations 
with their “friends”13 (Foursquare), a virtual catalogue of their 
possessions via YingYang.com,14 and their real-time credit card 
purchases (Blippy).15  As users of second generation social 
networking allow their “friends” to track their movements on a 
continual basis, and allow them access to increasing amounts of 
personal information, it will become increasingly important for the 
 
 9 MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 2002).  
 10 Location-based social networking refers to applications, websites, and online 
networks that use global positioning system (“GPS”) technology to pinpoint the real-time 
location of the user and allow other users access to that information.  GPS uses satellites 
and a hand-held device carried by the user to track the location of the user and then 
broadcast that location on the Internet.  See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 13.    
 11 About Loopt, http://www.loopt.com/about (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
 12 Foursquare, http://www.foursquare.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
 13 Id.  A “friend” on Facebook or YingYang is a connection requested by one user and 
confirmed by another user, which allows both parties access to certain information each 
user has provided to the site.  Usually, the “friending” process substantiates an existing 
real world connection, but not always. See, e.g., William Lozito, Facebook Linguistics: 
Changing the Definition of Friend/Unfriend, NAME WIRE, Jan. 30, 2009, 
http://www.namedevelopment.com/blog/archives/2009/01/facebook_lingui.html. 
 14 YingYang, http://www.yingyang.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).  
 15 Blippy, http://www.blippy.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
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sites themselves to actively and cooperatively ensure the protection 
of their users’ privacy. 
We are at the dawning of a new age in terms of privacy, and 
the rapidly changing landscape of privacy rights and expectations 
will force hard decisions to be made regarding what aspects of a 
person’s identity should be protected as private information as 
users of social networks willingly divulge more and more personal 
information.  As social networks expand and share their 
application programming interfaces (“APIs”), information posted 
and shared by users will be updated across platforms.  Likewise, 
when information is shared across and between social networks, 
the enforceability and predictability of which privacy policy 
governs that sharing of that information becomes complicated.  
This Note seeks to make sense of U.S. privacy law as it relates to 
social networking.  With more and more social networks making 
use of location-based technology, and an increasing amount of 
information existing online about social networking users, the 
issues raised in this Note and how courts, legislatures, and the 
Internet community resolve them will undoubtedly shape the future 
of technology, communication, and Internet commerce. 
Recent scholarship on legal issues relating to privacy policies 
and the enforceability of terms of use agreements has been written 
from the perspective of consumers,16 alternatively warning users of 
“contracting away control over personal information,”17 accusing 
social networks of “industrial-scale identity theft”18 and seeking 
 
 16 See, e.g., Mike Hatch, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive 
Personal Information from Commercial Interests in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2001) (arguing that the sale and commercial use of users’ 
information is a violation of individual privacy rights); Edward J. Janger, Muddy 
Property: Generating and Protecting Information Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy, 44 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1801, 1878 (2003) (advocating greater consumer privacy rights through 
the gathering of personal information by Internet companies during bankruptcy 
proceedings); Andrew Hotaling, Comment, Protecting Personally Identifiable 
Information on the Internet: Notice and Consent in the Age of Behavioral Targeting, 16 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 529, 531 (2008) (arguing that consumers are “[i]nadequately 
protected against private actors by state and federal statutes”). 
 17 See generally Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away 
Control over Personal Information?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 587 (2007). 
 18 Rohit Khare, Privacy Theater: Why Social Networks Only Pretend to Protect You, 
TECHCRUNCH, Dec. 27, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/27/privacy-theater. 
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legal avenues, as strained as they may be, of holding websites 
liable for using personal information.19  This Note takes an 
alternative perspective by advocating an approach that focuses on 
increased industry self-regulation, recognizing that overprotection 
of consumer privacy has the potential to stifle entrepreneurship and 
cripple Internet-based commerce and innovation.  Despite concerns 
over users not reading or understanding the terms of use 
agreements that govern the use of personal information on a social 
network, a more flexible, reactive, and fluid approach to privacy20 
offers the benefit of being able to adapt to the incredibly rapid pace 
of change in privacy expectations due to the growth and use of 
social networks.21  This approach does not suggest that social 
networks abdicate responsibility for their users’ privacy.  Rather, it 
encourages the social networking industry, which includes 
businesses as small as YingYang and those as dominant as Google, 
to take several steps to affirmatively protect their users’ privacy 
and create an environment where users can feel comfortable 
sharing information.  As comprehensive legislative overhauls of 
privacy law wind their way through the legislative process, this 
Note urges Congress to be aware of both the tradition of Internet 
self-regulation and the benefits of a laissez-faire approach to 
privacy before taking irreversibly misguided action.22 
 
 19 Yasamine Hashemi, Note, Facebook’s Privacy Policy and Its Third Party 
Partnerships: Lucrativity and Liability, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 140, 150–56 (2009) 
(exploring “whether Facebook’s privacy policy could be used to bring a cause of action” 
and describing three potential claims users might pursue against Facebook). 
 20 See, e.g., Facebook’s Privacy Policy, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
 21 Facebook, for example, as of this writing, is less than six years old and yet has over 
350 million users. Facebook Factsheet, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php? 
statistics (last visited Jan. 27, 2010).  
 22 See, e.g., Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. 1490, 111th Cong. (2009).  
Senator Leahy introduced the PDSA with the following goals:  
 Increase criminal penalties for identity theft involving electronic 
personal data and make it a crime to intentionally or willfully 
conceal a security breach involving personal data;  
 Give individuals access to, and the opportunity to correct, any 
personal information held by commercial data brokers;  
 Require entities that maintain personal data to establish internal 
policies that protect the personal data of Americans;  
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Part I of this Note examines the existing laws and 
jurisprudence on privacy, terms of use agreements, and issues 
surrounding user-generated content.  While courts, legislatures, 
and academics have put forth many potential resolutions to the 
privacy issues discussed in this piece, this Note will examine three: 
a common law approach, a comprehensive statutory approach, and 
a free-market approach.  Part II of this Note analyzes two 
approaches to modifying privacy law and terms of use agreement 
law to respond to recent issues that have arisen as a result of 
location-based social networking applications and sites.  One 
approach is the common law modification approach, whereby 
courts take it upon themselves to reshape terms of use agreements 
when the plaintiff alleges an infringement of privacy.  The second 
approach is a legislative one, advocated and adopted by 
international communities and a number of legal academics, which 
would comprehensively overhaul privacy law in the United States.  
Part III offers an alternative approach to both of the approaches 
discussed in Part II; while recognizing a limited role for Congress, 
this approach relies on the free market and cooperative action by 
social networks to remedy and prevent breaches of privacy and use 
of personal information.  Relying on recent events in the social 
networking industry and recognizing the complexity that APIs 
contribute to the enforceability of terms of use agreements, the 
approach offered by this Note encourages Congress to codify and 
courts to apply strict notice requirements to terms of use 
agreements.  At the same time, this Note argues against legislative 
interference with social networks, which would be a radical 
reversal for United States privacy policy.  As this Note will argue, 
the free market and industry self-regulation offer the most 
 
 Require entities that maintain personal data to give notice to 
individuals and law enforcement when they experience a breach 
involving sensitive personal data; and  
 Require the government to establish rules protecting privacy and 
security when it uses information from commercial data brokers, 
to conduct audits of government contracts with data brokers and 
impose penalties on government contractors that fail to meet 
data privacy and security requirements. 
Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Judiciary Committee Advances Leahy’s 
Cybersecurity Bill (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_ 
releases/release/?id=bf6687fb-676b-4444-91bb-c66afec6cb9a. 
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practical, effective, and predictable approach for both consumers 
and companies in a rapidly changing landscape of privacy 
expectations in the social networking space. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF TERMS OF USE AGREEMENTS LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Part I.A of this Note examines the history of privacy law in the 
United States.  Recognizing the complexities of privacy law as a 
discrete sector of U.S. law, this Note focuses with particular 
emphasis on information privacy law.  Legal protection for basic 
information privacy has deep roots in American and English 
jurisprudence, yet does not resemble the comprehensive and 
thoroughness of other legal systems.  Part I.B analyzes the 
intersection of basic contract principles in terms of use agreements.  
Terms of use agreements, which are primarily a common law 
creation, fit untidily within traditional notions of contract law, 
thereby perpetuating an uneasy tension as courts seek to interpret 
their creation and content in the Internet age. 
A. Privacy Law 
Privacy law, as a discrete sector of American law, is a rather 
fragmented and incomplete body of law.23  This Note looks 
specifically at information privacy law, which is distinguished 
from sexual privacy law or family planning privacy law.24  
Information privacy law derives from three primary sources: (1) 
the Constitution, (2) legislation, and, to a lesser extent, (3) 
academia.25  Part I.A.1–3 of this Note will examine the 
development of information privacy law in chronological order.  
Accordingly, Part I.A of this Note will begin by looking at the 
 
 23 See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, ‘La Difference’ Is Stark in EU, U.S. Privacy Laws, MSNBC, 
Oct. 16, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15221111/ns/technology_and_science-
privacy_lost. 
 24 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2002) 
[hereinafter Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy] (identifying six classifications of privacy 
rights, one being “control over personal information”). 
 25 See Hotaling, supra note 16, at 541 (explaining the sources of information privacy 
law); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
855–56 (3d ed. 2006).   
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colonial era, followed by the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth century, when privacy law became institutionalized.  
Finally, Part I.A.4 will look at twenty-first century developments 
in information privacy law.  By exploring the roots of information 
privacy law, this subsection will seek to provide a working 
definition of information privacy rights and explore the 
complexities posed by social networking sites to those rights. 
1. Colonial Era Foundations of Information Privacy Law 
This section of this Note will examine the roots of information 
privacy law.  Although understandings, definitions, and 
implications of information privacy law have morphed 
considerably since the eighteen and nineteenth century, shaping the 
future of information privacy law requires an understanding of its 
roots.26  Despite the low population density of America at its 
founding, early American laws demonstrate that privacy was not 
taken for granted.27  The relatively few number of people in these 
early settlements meant, “everybody knew each other’s 
business.”28  Accordingly, laws existed to protect personal privacy.  
Professor Solove identifies laws against eavesdropping29 and 
against being a “common scold,” which applied only to women as 
early examples of privacy focused laws.30  Importantly, both of 
these examples of colonial privacy protection law assume a lack of 
consent by the invadee.  In other words, presumably, should those 
who are speaking grant permission to the “eavesdropper” to “listen 
under walls or windows,” the action would no longer be a crime, 
 
 26 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND 
TECHNOLOGY 2 (2d ed. 2009) (“Information privacy law is an interrelated web of tort 
law, federal and state constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, evidentiary 
privileges, property law, contract law, and criminal law.  Information privacy law is 
relatively new, although its roots reach far back.”). 
 27 DAVID FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 133 (1972). 
 28 Daniel J. Solove, The Origins and Growth of Information Privacy Law, 828 PLI/Pat 
23, 27 (2005) [hereinafter Solove, Origins].  
 29 Id. at 27 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
168 (1769)) (defining eavesdropping as “listen[ing] under walls or windows, or the eaves 
of a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and 
mischievous tales”). 
 30 See DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 7 (1978).  
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even if the eavesdropper heard more than the invadee originally 
intended. 
Nonetheless, early American privacy laws focus primarily on 
intrusions of the government on privacy.31  Of particular concern 
to prominent early Americans was the government’s use of general 
warrants and writs of assistance.32  Noted as “the worst instrument 
of arbitrary power . . . that ever was found in the English law 
book,”33 writs of assistance allowed officials to enter a house and 
conduct “sweeping searches and seizures without any evidentiary 
basis.”34  General warrants authorized similarly intrusive searches 
and seizures, often resulting in the ransacking and arbitrary seizure 
of the papers and writings of political dissenters.35  Again, it is 
important to note that the Framers were principally concerned with 
the one-sided, powerful central government conducting 
unauthorized searches of the house. 
The Framers formalized their concerns with privacy in the Bill 
of Rights, with privacy being a central component of the Third, 
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.  The Third Amendment protects 
the privacy of the home by barring the government from requiring 
the quartering of soldiers in a private home, “without the consent 
of the Owner.”36  The Fourth Amendment “provides broad 
limitations on the government’s power to search and seize”37 and 
 
 31 See Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 28 (“At the time of the Revolutionary War, 
the central privacy issue was freedom from government intrusion.”).  
 32 See id. (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 158 (1999); 
Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994)). 
 33 James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance, Boston, Mass. (Feb. 1761) (transcript 
available at The National Humanities Institute). 
 34 Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as 
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 82 (1998). 
 35 See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1979); see also 
William Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 
405–07 (1995).  
 36 U.S. CONST. amend. III.  For a more fulsome analysis of laws protecting the privacy 
of one’s home, see Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 27–28 (citing Semayne’s Case, 
(1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.); BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 168; Note, The Right to 
Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1894 (1981)).  Professor 
Solove identifies protection of one’s home as fundamental to the idea of privacy law in 
America. See id.  
 37 Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 28. 
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prevents the practice of general warrants or overly broad searches 
conducted by the government.38  Finally, the Fifth Amendment 
gives individuals the right not to be compelled to testify against 
themselves.39  The government cannot compel an individual to 
speak against his own interests during a criminal proceeding.40  A 
detailed examination of these amendments is beyond the scope of 
this Note, however, it is nonetheless important for courts, 
legislatures and start-up companies alike to recognize that 
America’s earliest attempts to protect its citizens from privacy 
intrusions focused on arbitrary searches in which one party did not 
give consent to the other party for such an intrusion. 
2. The Nineteenth and Twentieth Century in Information 
Privacy Law 
During the nineteenth century, American law began to mature 
as more discrete privacy concerns began to arise.  The practice of 
collecting information for the census became controversial when 
the number of personal questions asked by the federal government 
boomed from four for the first census in 1790 to 142 in 1860.41  A 
public outcry erupted in 1890 when the census asked about family 
diseases and finances, leading to legislation in the early twentieth 
century limiting the scope of information included in and produced 
by the census.42  Additionally, the security and confidentiality of 
the mail system were major issues during the nineteenth century.43  
 
 38 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”). 
 39 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
 40 Id. 
 41 See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 46 (1995). 
 42 Id. at 47.  
 43 Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 30. 
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Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, 
Alexander Hamilton, and even Ralph Waldo Emerson expressed 
concerns over their ability to transmit correspondence safely and 
privately.44  Concerns with the security of the mail system led 
Congress to pass several laws criminalizing the unauthorized 
opening of mail.45  The Supreme Court provided constitutional 
protection to privacy of correspondence when it held, in Ex parte 
Jackson,46 that the Fourth Amendment required government 
officials to obtain a permit before opening letters.47 
Mirroring the privacy concerns that have arisen as a result of 
the expansion of the Internet, the development of a new 
technology, telegraphs, raised red flags over privacy of 
correspondence and control of personal information.48  During the 
Civil War, the Union and Confederate armies tapped each other’s 
telegraph lines and rival news organizations attempted to “scoop” 
each other by intercepting telegrams.49  The New York Times called 
the practice “an outrage upon the liberties of the citizen.”50  While 
a bill introduced in Congress to protect telegraphs ultimately 
failed, several courts secured the privacy of telegraphs by 
analogizing them to letters and more than half of the states enacted 
 
 44 Id.; see also ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND 
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 49–50 (2000) (explaining that 
Benjamin Franklin required his employees to swear not to open his mail and describing 
Emerson’s frustrations with the mail system). 
 45 SMITH, supra note 44, at 50–52. A statute passed in 1825 provided:   
Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post 
office or any unauthorized depository for mail matter, or from any 
letter or mail carrier, . . . before it has been delivered to the person to 
whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, or 
to pry into the business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes, 
embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned. 
Id. at 52. 
 46 96 U.S. 727 (1877).  
 47 Id. at 733.  
 48 See Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 31–32.  
 49 Id. at 31; see also REGAN, supra note 41, at 111. 
 50 SEIPP, supra note 30, at 31.  
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laws prohibiting the disclosure of telegraph messages by company 
employees.51 
Commentators also point to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Boyd v. United States52 as an important development in 
information privacy law.53  In Boyd, the government sought to 
compel a merchant to produce personal and business documents in 
a civil forfeiture proceeding.54  The Court relied on both the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments in striking down the government’s 
request.55  In its most articulate definition of privacy to that point, 
the Court stated that allowing such a request would be an “invasion 
of [the merchant’s] indefeasible right to personal security, personal 
liberty and private property.”56  Accordingly, Boyd and its progeny 
established a powerful legal recognition of personal privacy.57 
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published The 
Right to Privacy,58 an article that would define and shape close to a 
century of privacy law.59  Warren and Brandeis argued that 
common law could and should develop greater protections for 
privacy rights.60  Warren and Brandeis’s article is particularly 
 
 51 See, e.g., Ex parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 95 (Mo. 1880) (holding that a subpoena for 
telegrams must fail because “such an inquisition . . . would destroy the usefulness” of 
telegrams); see also SEIPP, supra note 30, at 65.  
 52 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 53 See, e.g., SEIPP, supra note 30, at 70; Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 32; William 
J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 
1054–55 (1995).  
 54 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 619. 
 55 See id. at 634–38. 
 56 Id. at 630. 
 57 Stuntz, supra note 53, at 1050. 
 58 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 59 See, e.g., ALPHEUS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70 (1946) (noting that 
the article “add[ed] a chapter to our law”); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were 
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966) (calling the 
Warren and Brandeis article the “most influential law review article of all”); Solove, 
Origins, supra note 28, at 34 (describing the publication of Warren and Brandeis’s article 
as “the most profound development in privacy law”). 
 60 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 58, at 198 (“The common law secures to each 
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, 
and emotions shall be communicated to others.”); see also Solove, Origins, supra note 
28, at 35 (“Warren and Brandeis argued that the common law could readily develop a 
remedy for protecting privacy.”). 
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relevant to this Note because it argued that the development of 
technology, most notably “instantaneous photography,”61 and an 
increase in the availability and prevalence of newspapers would 
lead to widespread privacy abuses.62  Warren and Brandeis argued 
that these threats required a remedy and recognized that existing 
tort law, such as defamation and libel, protected against the spread 
of false information but not true private information.63  They 
acknowledged however, that traditional common law concepts 
such as contract and property were not adequate for the mode of 
protection they envisioned and, instead, urged courts to develop a 
discrete common law action and remedy for protecting privacy 
based on a more general right of “the individual to be let alone.”64  
Arguably, privacy rights and protections reached an apex towards 
the end of the nineteenth century.65  Congress and courts retreated 
significantly from such an inclusive definition of privacy as the 
twentieth century progressed and the government’s need for 
personal information increased with the rise of the powerful 
“fourth branch,” administrative agencies.66 
Warren and Brandeis’s article had tremendous influence over 
courts and legislatures in the beginning of the twentieth century.67  
In 1902, the New York Court of Appeals, New York state’s 
highest court, heard the case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box 
Co.68  The court held that the plaintiff, who sued because an 
advertisement used a picture of her without her consent, failed to 
 
 61 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 58, at 195 (“Instantaneous photographs and 
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and 
numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is 
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”). 
 62 Id. at 196 (“The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of 
propriety and of decency.  Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, 
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.”). 
 63 See id. at 214–18. 
 64 Id. at 205, 214–18. 
 65 See Stuntz, supra note 53, at 1052 (“As it happened, the cases did not continue along 
Boyd’s path.  Beginning in the first decade of this [twentieth] century, Boyd was 
effectively cabined . . . .”). 
 66 See Martin Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1819 
(1996). 
 67 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 388–89 (1960) (recording 
over 300 privacy cases spawned by the Warren and Brandeis article).  
 68 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).  
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state a cause of action because “no precedent for such an action 
[can] be found in the decisions of this court.”69  A significant 
debate ensued from the court’s decision, as New York Times 
editorials and law review articles extolled the need to create a tort 
for breaches of privacy.70  In 1903, New York did indeed enact 
such a statute.71  In the years following the Roberson decision, 
state courts and legislatures continued to develop privacy law and 
expand the remedies available to plaintiffs who suffered invasions 
of that right.72  By 1960, the Restatement of Torts enshrined much 
of what Warren and Brandeis had argued for in their landmark 
article.73  The Restatement included four privacy torts: (1) 
Intrusion Upon Seclusion, (2) Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 
(3) False Light, and (4) Appropriation.74 
Wiretapping and the power of the federal government to 
conduct surveillance on American citizens became the central front 
of the battle for increased privacy rights in the middle of the 
twentieth century.  First, in 1928, the Supreme Court held in 
Olmstead v. United States75 that the Fourth Amendment did not 
require the government to obtain a search warrant before 
wiretapping a telephone.76  Congress subsequently enacted section 
605 of the Federal Communications Act, which prohibited the 
 
 69 Id. at 443. 
 70 Denis O’Brien, The Right to Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 437 (1902) (providing 
examples of New York Times editorials). 
 71 For a current version of this law, see N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 2009).   
 72 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905) (holding 
that the “right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore derived from natural law”).  
 73 The Restatement of Torts is a non-binding but persuasive and ostensibly objective 
attempt by a committee of experienced practitioners and legal academics to articulate a 
consensus on the current state of tort law.  
 74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2).  A detailed discussion of the case law 
that led to each of these torts is beyond the scope of this Note; see Solove, Origins, supra 
note 28, at 37–40, for more discussion and history.  
 75 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  
 76 Id. at 464 (“There was no searching.  There was no seizure.  The evidence was 
secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.  There was no entry of the 
houses of offices of the defendants.”). But see id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the 
government.  Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by 
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of 
what is whispered in the closet.”).  
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interception and disclosure of intercepted communications by 
federal, but not state, officials.77  In subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions,78 the court limited the reach of § 605, holding that the 
law restricted officials “only from disclosing intercepted 
communications in court proceedings,” not from wiretapping in the 
first place.79  Throughout the twentieth century, wiretapping 
became widespread and increased exponentially as a result of these 
rulings.80 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court substantially 
developed privacy law in a series of decisions.81  Ultimately, the 
Court recognized a “zone of privacy” as a constitutional right 
insulated from interference by federal and state actors, but stopped 
short of recognizing such a right as enforceable against private 
actors.82  In Griswold v. Connecticut,83 the Court held that the right 
to privacy against state and federal actors is a “penumbra” of rights 
“created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees” found 
in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.84  In United States v. 
Miller,85 on the other hand, the Court held that personal financial 
records in possession of third parties are not within the “zone of 
privacy” recognized in Griswold.86  Congress acted quickly to 
provide the protection to privacy that the Court refused to 
recognize in Miller.87 
 
 77 Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 
1064, 1103–04 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006)).  
 78 See, e.g., Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (finding evidence 
obtained as the fruit of illegal wiretapping could not be used in court); Nardone v. United 
States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) (excluding evidence directly obtained by wiretapping). 
 79 Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 43; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. 
ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING,  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 260 (3d ed. 2000). 
 80 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1128–33 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Digital Dossiers]. 
 81 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 
(1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 82 See Hotaling, supra note 16, at 542–43.  
83 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 84 Id. at 485.  
85  425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 86 Id. at 443 (“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the 
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”). 
 87 See Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).  
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While Congress enacted a number of privacy laws in the 
1970s,88 the focus of this Note is on the expectation of privacy and 
privacy rights between private parties.  Congress’s first attempt to 
regulate such commercial behavior came in 1978 with the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”).89  In a nod to Justice Brennan’s 
dissent in Miller,90 the RFPA prohibited banks and other financial 
institutions from disclosing personal financial information about 
their customers without a subpoena or search warrant.91  The 
statute is limited in scope, providing evidence of Congress’s 
hesitation to interfere with the market. 
The blossoming of federal legislation protecting privacy in the 
1970s would continue in the 1980s with several new statutes, the 
most significant of which was the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (“ECPA”).92  Title I, the Wiretap Act,93 and Title II, 
the Stored Communications Act,94 of the ECPA dramatically 
strengthened both the civil and criminal penalties private actors 
faced for violations of privacy and unauthorized disclosure of 
 
 88 See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 
1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C (2006)); Privacy Act of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)); 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Foreign Bank Secrecy Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1118 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.); Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 
89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 1002). 
 89 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 90 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 447–54 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Hotaling, supra 
note 16, at 543 (“[T]he reasoning behind [Justice Brennan’s] dissenting opinion became 
highly influential in Congress’s efforts to protect an individual’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy in various forms of personally identifiable information.”). 
 91 12 U.S.C. § 3407. 
 92 18 U.S.C. § 2510; see also Katherine A. Oyama, E-Mail Privacy After United States 
v. Councilman: Legislative Options for Amending ECPA, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 499, 
503 (2006) (explaining that the ECPA provides constitutional protection due to the 
unclear gap in the Fourth Amendment’s application to cyberspace); Paul Taylor, The 
Scope of Government Access to Copies of Electronic Communications Stored with 
Internet Service Providers: A Review of Legal Standards, 6 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 109, 117 
(2001) (noting the enactment of the ECPA as Congress’s response to the emergence of 
electronic communication and the digital era). 
 93 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22. 
 94 Id. §§ 2701–11. 
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personal information.  Reflecting a consistent congressional desire 
to avoid overly burdening market transactions, the ECPA 
exempted intentional interceptions of communications if one party 
to the transaction consented.95  Further, the Stored 
Communications Act allows for a defense based on consent.96  The 
extent to which a clicked-through terms of agreement amounts to 
consent for the purposes of avoiding liability under the ECPA and 
other federal privacy laws is the subject of much debate and, 
partially, the focus of this Note.97  Nonetheless, it is clear that 
Congress intended to allow private parties a means of contracting 
around the restrictions embodied in the ECPA.98 
3. Recent Developments in the Law of Information Privacy 
The computer came into the public consciousness during the 
1960s and sparked an immediate concern with privacy disclosures 
made through the computer.99  The interests and concerns first 
expressed at the dawn of the computer age have become more 
acute as personal computing has grown and the data collected by 
Internet-based companies has become more comprehensive.  
Congress has reacted by passing a number of privacy protection 
statutes.100  The most important mechanism in enforcing privacy 
protection has been the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) 
efforts to make companies accountable when they violate their 
own privacy policies. 
 
 95 Id. § 2511(2)(d). 
 96 Id. § 2702(b)(3).  
 97 See discussion infra Part II. 
 98 See Hotaling, supra note 16, at 545. 
 99 See Solove, Origins, supra note 28, at 48 & n.162 (citing MYRON BRENTON, THE 
PRIVACY INVADERS (1964); ARTHUR MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971); NOMOS 
XII: PRIVACY (J. Ronald Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1971); VANCE PACKARD, THE 
NAKED SOCIETY (1964); ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); ALAN WESTIN & 
MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING AND 
PRIVACY (1972); Clark C. Havighurst, Foreword: Symposium, Privacy, 31 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 251 (1966); Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls over the 
Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342 
(1966); Symposium, Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REV. 
211 (1968)).  
 100 See Acts cited supra note 88.  
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One statute that merits consideration is the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (“GLBA”) of 1999.101  The law allowed financial 
institutions with different branches to share “nonpublic personal 
information” between affiliates.102  The law included a requirement 
for affiliates to notify customers that their information would be 
shared, but it did not allow consumers to stop the sharing.103  The 
law is important because it demonstrates Congress’s lack of 
consistency on the issue of privacy, as this law lacks even the 
consent requirement most other laws contained.  Most financial 
institutions did include an opt-out provision, but few customers 
opted-out, complaining that the privacy policies were confusing or 
misleading.104  The arguments against the opt-out provisions 
financial institutions used to comply with the GLBA are similar to 
those being advanced presently by courts, legislators, and 
consumer advocates against the click-through terms of use used by 
most websites today—they complain that the agreements are 
vague, cumbersome, and difficult to understand.105 
Over the past ten years, the FTC has been responsible for the 
largest amount of work with respect to protecting personal 
information on the Internet.106  The FTC can bring enforcement 
actions against companies who fail to abide by their own privacy 
policies.107  Enforcement actions for violations of privacy policies 
are generally resolved between the company and the FTC in a 
settlement, resulting in a dearth of case-law on the subject.108  
However, it seems clear that as long as the company abides by its 
 
 101 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09).  
 102 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a)–(b). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information 
Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1230–31 (2002). 
 105 See Hotaling, supra note 16, at 552. 
 106 See Haynes, supra note 17, at 603, 613–14; Hashemi, supra note 19, at 155. 
 107 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2).  
 108 Hashemi, supra note 19, at 155–56; cf. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored 
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1208, 1208 (2004) (highlighting that only a few cases explain how the Stored 
Communications Act works). 
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own privacy policy, regardless of how broad it may be, the 
company will likely not be subject to FTC enforcement.109 
While the events of September 11, 2001, certainly reshaped 
privacy as a body of law, most of those shifts have occurred within 
the government-citizen relationship.  The focus of this Note 
concerns privacy law between private parties in the commercial 
context, and accordingly, this Note will not focus on the USA 
PATRIOT Act110 or related wiretapping issues raised in the wake 
of the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  More important to this discussion is 
the extent to which terms of use agreements and contracts validly 
transfer rights of control over personal information freely given by 
users to companies on the Internet. 
4. Recent Controversies 
Lately, there has been increasing attention paid to the 
information that users of social networking sites disseminate on the 
Internet and to the control social networking sites exercise over 
that information.111  Of particular concern is the extent to which 
social networking websites should be allowed to sell, distribute, or 
otherwise transmit information to third party application 
developers.112  Once a user submits information about his or her 
birthday for example, the social network can then give that 
 
 109 See Hashemi, supra note 19, at 156; cf. Haynes, supra note 17, at 588 (“[I]f the 
website complies with its own promises, there is little else to prevent the site from doing 
with the information whatever it wants—sharing, selling or otherwise making use of the 
information—besides the website company’s own interest in attracting and maintaining 
customers.”).  
 110 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).  
 111 See Jason Kincaid, Massive Facebook and MySpace Flash Vulnerability Exposes 
User Data, TECHCRUNCH, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/11/05/massive 
-facebook-and-myspace-flash-vulnerability-exposes-user-data; see also Jason Kincaid, 
Facebook Rewrites Privacy Policy, Foreshadows Location Services, TECHCRUNCH, Oct. 
29, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/10/29/facebook-rewrites-privacy-policy-
foreshadows-location-based-services; Posting of Alistair Croll to GigaOm, Big Internet Is 
Web 2.0’s OS—So Who Owns the Apps?, http://gigaom.com (Oct. 18, 2007, 21:00 EST).  
 112 See ANDREW BESMER ET AL., SOCIAL APPLICATION: EXPLORING A MORE SECURE 
FRAMEWORK 1 (2009), available at http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2009/proceedings/a2-
besmer.pdf. 
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information to an external developer.113  The external developer 
can then plug that information into an algorithm, which then 
becomes permanently part of the third party’s program or 
application.114  Even if the user abandons the social network, the 
user’s information is not only no longer within the user’s control,  
it is also no longer within the social network’s control.115 This 
situation raises significant issues about privacy as the relationship, 
as is, creates a nearly irrevocable level of access to the user’s 
information once the user agrees to the terms of use agreement. 
In November of 2007, Facebook launched its now infamous 
Beacon program with forty-four partner websites.116  Beacon 
essentially tracked a Facebook user’s movements around the 
Internet and broadcast certain activities on the user’s wall as part 
of his or her news feed.117  Even if a Facebook user was not signed 
into Facebook at the time, information between Facebook and the 
partner site was exchanged and then disseminated via Facebook.118  
Lacking an obvious opt-out mechanism and instituted 
automatically, Beacon soon became a focal point of user ire, 
prompting a string of critical blog posts on technology blogs and a 
number of Facebook user groups devoted to its termination.119  
Sure enough, in early 2009, Facebook abandoned the program and 
apologized to its users for abusing their trust and personal 
 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id.  
 115 See, e.g., Facebook’s Privacy Policy, supra note 20. 
 116 Press Release, Facebook, Leading Websites Offer Facebook Beacon for Social 
Distribution (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=9166 
(“Additional websites and companies participating in Beacon at launch include 
AllPosters.com, Blockbuster, Bluefly.com, CBS Interactive (CBSSports.com & 
Dotspotter), ExpoTV, Gamefly, Hotwire, Joost, Kiva, Kongregate, LiveJournal, Live 
Nation, Mercantila, National Basketball Association, NYTimes.com, Overstock.com, 
(RED), Redlight, SeamlessWeb, Sony Online Entertainment LLC, Sony Pictures, STA 
Travel, The Knot, TripAdvisor, Travel Ticker, TypePad, viagogo, Vox, Yelp, 
WeddingChannel.com and Zappos.com.”). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See, e.g., The Idea Shower, Block Facebook Beacon, http://www.ideashower.com/ 
blog/block-facebook-beacon (Nov. 7, 2007). 
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information.120  During the Beacon program, Facebook faced the 
defection of thousands of users.121 
Facebook caused another controversy with its changes in terms 
of use and privacy policy in December 2009.  On December 5, 
2009, Facebook alerted all of its members when they signed on to 
the site that their privacy settings had been changed and were now 
set for automatic indexing on public search engines.  Previously, 
the information on Facebook was not accessible via a standard 
search engine.  The “blogosphere” erupted in outrage over 
Facebook’s change in policy.122  As of the writing of this article, 
Facebook has not responded to the controversy.  Facebook’s two 
privacy controversies attract attention to a difficult and 
complicated issue, thereby strengthening calls for Congress to pass 
laws making Facebook’s abuse of privacy illegal. 
Second generation social networks have contributed to recent 
worries regarding privacy as well.  RockYou, a social networking 
site, had accumulated 32,603,388 users and their personal 
identification since its launch in 2006.123  On December 14, 2009, 
the company came under a firestorm of criticism when Imperva, a 
security firm, discovered that RockYou stored the passwords of all 
of its users in an easily accessible, plaintext format online.124  By 
storing the websites in such an obvious manner and by not 
protecting the information from discovery, RockYou demonstrated 
 
 120 Facebook to Terminate the Beacon Program, FINANCIAL, Aug. 12, 2009, 
http://www.finchannel.com/Main_News/Tech/53576_Facebook_to_terminate_the_Beaco
n_program. 
 121 On December 3, 2009, Facebook settled a set of claims concerning its Beacon 
program and notified users of the settlement. See Posting of Nick O’Neil to All 
Facebook, Facebook Users Receive Notice of Pending Class Action Settlement, 
http://www.allfacebook.com/2009/12/facebook-users-receive-notice-of-pending-
facebook-settlement/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign= 
Feed%3A+allfacebook+%28Facebook+Blog%29 (Dec. 3, 2009, 18:45 EST). 
 122 See, e.g., Jason Kincaid, The Facebook Privacy Fiasco Begins, TECHCRUNCH, Dec. 
9, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/09/facebook-privacy/?utm_source=feed 
burner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Techcrunch+%28TechCrunch&
29; Brennon Slattery, Why Privacy Concerns Are Ruining Facebook, PCWORLD, Dec. 2, 
2009, http://www.pcworld.com/article/183530/why_privacy_concerns_are_ruining_ 
facebook.html.  
 123 See Khare, supra note 18. 
 124 Serious SQL Flaw Could Have Compromised Millions of Rockyou.com Users, 
TECHCRUNCH, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=8612. 
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the vulnerabilities of an industry that lacks statutory protection.  
RockYou violated its own terms of use agreement by not 
protecting the information and passwords of its users, yet lawsuits 
brought in reaction to the security breach are unlikely to yield 
favorable results.125 
Despite the existence of privacy laws in Colonial America, in 
recent decades, information privacy law in the U.S. has been 
constructed on an ad hoc basis, resulting in a set of rights that 
depend on private enforcement instead of enforcement through the 
courts.126  While courts have certainly been instrumental in 
initiating and recognizing a set of information privacy rights, most 
of those rights have been either protected against government 
intrusion or left to the market to protect in the private sector.127  
Importantly, despite various attempts by Congress to define and 
protect privacy rights,128 the rapidly changing landscape of 
technology and social networks have left current protections and 
laws in place out of date and ineffective.  Social networking sites 
are effectively being called to ensure online privacy protection by 
Congress’s repeated failures to do so lest users abandon this 
otherwise beneficial commercial activity. 
B. Terms of Use and Basic Contract Principles 
Courts have struggled recently to determine the extent to which 
traditional contract principles apply to terms of use agreements in 
the electronic commerce context.129  The resolution of this turmoil 
will have dramatic consequences for Internet companies, especially 
 
 125 See Khare, supra note 18; see also Nik Cubrilovic, RockYou Hack: From Bad to 
Worse, TECHCRUNCH, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/14/rockyou-
hack-security-myspace-facebook-passwords/. 
 126 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Enforcing Privacy Rights: Agency Enforcement and Private 
Rights of Action, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 877 (2003). 
 127 See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2002) (indicating that 
plaintiff asserted privacy rights for stored electronic communications). 
 128 See, e.g., Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006)); Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a). 
 129 See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (using 
ordinary contract principles, a shrinkwrap license is a valid and enforceable contract); 
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding 
software license agreements are binding contractual agreements). 
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social networking websites.  In order to understand the trouble 
courts and legislators have with applying traditional contract 
concepts to click-through terms of use agreements, it is necessary 
to define different forms of terms of use agreements and how 
contract law has been applied to them over the past twenty years.  
The first section of this Part will briefly examine basic contract law 
and principles.  Contract law is, for the most part, a creation of 
common law, meaning that the rules regulating the construction, 
interpretation, and enforcement of contracts have been crafted by 
court decisions on the topic and modified by legislation.  Next, this 
section looks at different forms of terms of use agreements and 
how the form of a terms of use agreement affects its enforceability 
in court. 
1. Basic Contract Law 
A contract is a legally enforceable promise or set of 
promises.130  While on its face, this definition seems simple 
enough, in fact, whether a contract exists at all is often a 
painstaking and fact-intensive inquiry.131  Contracts require an 
agreement; that is, there must be an offer and an acceptance of the 
terms of a contract in order to create a legally enforceable duty 
between the two parties to a contract.132  Additionally, contracts 
must contain consideration, which is “something (such as an act, a 
forbearance, or a return promise) bargained for and received by a 
promisor from a promisee.”133  Again, as used in everyday 
language, these requirements seem plain and straightforward 
enough, but decades of case law and competing interpretations 
 
 130 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981); 1 WILLISTON ON  CONTRACTS § 
1:1 (4th ed. 1990); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 1 (5th ed. 
2003). 
 131 PERILLO, supra note 130, at 1 (“No entirely satisfactory definition of the term 
‘contract’ has ever been devised.”). 
 132 Id. at 2 (“‘[A]greement’ is at the core of the law of contracts . . . .”). 
 133 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining consideration as an essential 
element to a contract “necessary for an agreement to be enforceable” (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81 (1979))); see also THOMAS E. HOLLAND, 
THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 286 (13th ed. 1924) (“‘[C]onsideration’ has been 
explained to be ‘any act of the plaintiff from which the defendant, or a stranger, derives a 
benefit or advantage . . . .’”).  
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demonstrate that finding and defining a contract is an endeavor 
riddled with complications.134 
A legally enforceable contract requires the assent of the parties 
it binds.135  Typically, establishing an agreement requires the 
process of offer and acceptance.136  As contract law has developed, 
there has been disagreement over what standard to use in 
determining the existence of assent, objective or subjective.137  
Advocates of a subjective approach to determining the existence 
and meaning of contracts argue that a “meeting of the minds” is 
required to substantiate the agreement between the parties.138  The 
subjective approach to contracts gives respect to party autonomy 
by recognizing the parties’ intentions primarily, instead of the 
literal meaning of the words in the contract.139  Strict subjective 
approaches to contract law would look “solely to the intention of 
the party” who created the contract or to whom the contract was 
directed.140  This approach is impractical because it would 
essentially allow any party the opportunity to escape its obligations 
to a contract by pleading that it intended something different than 
what is written.141  A more palatable subjective standard “would 
 
 134 See PERILLO, supra note 130, at 1–3. 
 135 Id. at 26 (“Usually an essential prerequisite to the formation of a contract is an 
agreement: a mutual manifestation of assent to the same terms.” (citing Russell v. Union 
Oil, 86 Cal. Rptr. 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Quality Sheet Metal v. Woods, 627 P.2d 
1128 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981); Brown v. Considine, 310 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1981); Christenson v. Billings Livestock Comm’n, 653 P.2d 492 (Mont. 1982))). 
 136 See id. at 26 (citing Dura-Wood Treating v. Century Forest Indus., 675 F.2d 745 (5th 
Cir. 1982); Hahnemann Med. Coll. & Hosp. v. Hubbard, 406 A.2d 1120 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1979); Eisenberg v. Cont’l Cas., 180 N.W.2d 726 (Wis. 1970)). 
 137 See PERILLO, supra note 130, at 26–28. Compare Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent 
in the Formation of Contracts, in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 119, 
126 (1931) (advocating a subjective standard for determining the existence of assent), 
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1980) (requiring objective 
manifestation of agreement). 
 138 Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and 
Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 429 (2000). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Cf. id. at 429 (“It is improbable that any economically developed society would fully 
adopt either of these vantage points.  One party’s intentions would be subordinated to the 
idiosyncratic meanings of the other.  More importantly, if the legal system permits parties 
to testify as to their understandings or intentions, perjury as to their subjective states of 
mind would be extremely difficult to detect.”). 
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allow only such meanings as conform to an intention common to 
both or all the parties, and would attach this meaning although it 
violates the usage of all other persons.”142  The subjective 
approach is popular today in France, though in America, the 
objective approach holds sway.143 
The objective approach to contract law has dominated the 
common law of contracts in America for at least the past 
century.144  Like subjective approaches, there is no single 
“objective approach.”145  One objective approach to contract law is 
the “general usage” test, which dictates that the terms of the 
contract are enforceable as written, even if it is clear from other 
evidence that they are not the terms that either party intended.146  
This approach exhibits less respect for party autonomy than the 
subjective approach by subordinating the parties’ intent to the need 
for regular application of language; however, it does allow the 
courts interpreting contracts more ability to maintain consistency 
and predictability.147  More moderately, the objective test 
emphasizes the perspective of “the reasonable person in the 
position of the addressee” of the terms.148  This approach allows 
some room for differing understandings of language in the 
contract. 
 
 142 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 227(3) (1932).  The first Restatement stated this as a 
possible standard, but did not adopt it, and instead favored an objective standard.  
 143 See, e.g., 2 FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 1316–19 (R. Schlesinger ed., 1968); BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF 
CONTRACT 35, 47–49 (2d ed. 1992); cf. Perillo, supra note 138, at 430 (“Although some 
observers indicate that in practice there is little difference in result in the application of 
the French subjective approach and the common law’s objective approach, the difference 
in theory explains, among other things, why in France there is no definitive rule on 
whether an acceptance is effective on dispatch or on receipt.”). 
 144 Perillo, supra note 138, at 431–32 (“Consequently, contract law, when viewed 
together with the law of evidence, was a mixture of subjective and objective elements 
with the objective elements dominating the decisions of almost all concrete cases.”). 
 145 See id. at 431 (“Objective tests also vary.”). 
 146 See, e.g., Nicholson Air Servs., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 706 A.2d 124, 132 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (“When the language of the contract is clear, the court will 
presume that the parties intended what they expressed, even if the expression differs from 
the parties’ intentions at the time they created the contract.”); see also Perillo, supra note 
138, at 431.  
 147 See Perillo, supra note 138, at 431.  
 148 Id. 
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Courts generally interpret contracts in modern America using 
the objective standard.149  Accordingly, an offer and acceptance by 
at least two parties creates a set of legally enforceable duties 
between the parties as specified by the terms of the contract.  
However, terms of use agreements have recently become 
problematic for courts.  Due to the standardized form of terms of 
use agreements and the one-sided nature of the offer and 
acceptance process, courts have begun to look at the terms of use 
agreements offered by Internet companies as potentially outside 
the ambit of traditional contract interpretation.  Some courts have 
gone so far as to void terms of use agreements even though those 
agreements objectively meet the requirements for a valid contract. 
2. Terms of Use Agreements 
This section seeks to provide a working definition of different 
terms of use agreements and then discusses which contract 
doctrines and principles are most directly implicated by the 
proliferation of terms of use agreements.  This Note examines 
terms of use agreements because they typically govern both the 
privacy policy and control over the information provided by the 
user to the Internet company.150  This is particularly important in 
the context of social networking websites because users provide 
vast amounts of data about themselves to these websites.151  The 
extent of control that users retain over that information and the 
right to sell, use, and transmit that personal information is typically 
addressed in the terms to which users agree before accessing the 
website and handing over their information to the social 
network.152 
 
 149 2 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 6 (1st ed. 1855) (“Therefore, 
modern courts interpret contracts according to an ‘objective’ theory by first looking to the 
explicit words the parties used, and then by ‘giv[ing] to the contract the construction 
which will bring it as near to the actual meaning of the parties as the words they saw fit to 
employ . . . will permit.’”).  
 150 See generally Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2006) 
[hereinafter Lemley, Terms of Use]. 
 151 See, e.g., Facebook, supra note 2. 
 152 See, e.g., Facebook’s Privacy Policy, supra note 20. 
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a) What is a Terms of Use Agreement? 
For the purposes of this Note, a terms of use agreement is a set 
of promises proposed by a website and agreed to by the user of the 
website.  For example, YingYang.com is a social networking 
website that bases its concept of “friends” on users who have 
similar interests in material possessions, such as watch collections, 
sneakers, and more.153  When a user visits YingYang.com, he or 
she is required to accept YingYang, Inc.’s terms of use in order to 
become a user (i.e., get a handle, create a profile, post and tag 
pictures, etc.) on YingYang.com.154  The terms of use agreement 
henceforth governs the legal duties and liabilities between 
YingYang, Inc. and the users of YingYang.com.  Accordingly, the 
terms of use agreement delineates the legal responsibilities of both 
parties and what each party is allowed to do with the information 
of the other party.  Crafting a comprehensive terms of use 
agreement, therefore, is a crucial aspect of beginning a social 
networking website as courts will refer to the terms of use 
agreement to determine any claims that may arise between the two 
parties. 
Terms of use agreements come in three principal forms: 
shrinkwrap agreements, browsewrap agreements, and clickwrap 
agreements.155  Shrinkwrap agreements are licenses included with 
physical copies of software, purchased by a consumer.156  The 
contract theory behind these licenses is that “by breaking the 
shrinkwrap or running the program” the user consents to the terms 
of agreement; the user thereby creates a mutually binding contract 
based on his or her acceptance of the offer of terms of use by the 
producer of the software.157  A one-sided bargain offer such as this 
shrinkwrap agreement is a unilateral contract, and though 
examples of such contracts are rather scarce in non-electronic 
scenarios, they do exist.158 
 
 153 About YingYang, http://www.yingyang.com/about (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
 154 YingYang Terms of Use, http://www.yingyang.com/terms (last visited Feb. 18, 
2010). 
 155 See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 150, at 459–60.   
 156 Id. at 467. 
 157 Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1239 (1995) [hereinafter Lemley, Intellectual Property]. 
 158 See Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 551, 551 (1983).  
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Until 1996, every court confronted by shrinkwrap licenses held 
them unenforceable.159  Among other reasons, courts noted the 
lack of an opportunity for the consumer to review the terms before 
being bound by them,160 the lack of options for a user if he did not 
assent to the terms,161 and the lack of clear evidence of consent on 
the user’s part162 as reasons to hold shrinkwrap licenses 
unenforceable.  In 1996, Judge Easterbrook wrote an influential 
opinion upholding the terms of a shrinkwrap terms of use in 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.163  Judge Easterbrook relied on the 
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-204, which states that a 
contract may be formed in any manner to which the parties 
agree.164  Accordingly, Judge Easterbrook held that by installing 
the software, the user consented to the terms of use agreement 
included in the packaging.165  While not universally followed,166 
federal courts have, more often than not, held shrinkwrap 
agreements enforceable since 1996.167 
 
 159 Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 150, at 459 (citing Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. 
Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 102–03 (3d Cir. 1991); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 
847 F.2d 255, 268–70 (5th Cir. 1988); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 
F. Supp. 759, 763–66 (D. Ariz. 1993); Foresight Res. Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 
1006, 1009–10 (D. Kan. 1989)). 
 160 See, e.g., Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 104. 
 161 See, e.g., Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 270. 
 162 See, e.g., Ariz. Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 766. 
 163 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 164 U.C.C. § 2-204 (2004) (“Formation in General.  (1) A contract for sale of goods may 
be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including . . . conduct by both 
parties which recognizes the existence of a contract. . . . (2) An agreement sufficient to 
constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its making is 
undetermined.  (3) Even if one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale does not 
fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a 
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (“A 
contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, 
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.”). 
 165 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452–53. 
 166 See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 150, at 469 (citing Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 
104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000); Morgan Labs., Inc. v. Micro Data Base Sys., 
Inc., No. C96-3998TEH, 1997 WL 258886, at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1997); Novell v. 
Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224 (D. Utah 1997), vacated in part, 187 
F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999); Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 127 P.3d 560, 562 (Okla. 
2005), republished in 138 P.3d 826, 827 (Okla. 2005)). 
 167 Id. (citing Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 632 (8th Cir. 2005); Bowers 
v. Baystate Techs., 320 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop 
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Browsewrap agreements are terms of use agreements the user 
may not read at all; the user, however, consents to the terms of use 
by using the website.168  Browsewrap agreements are typically 
included on a website and accessed by clicking a link which often 
appears on the bottom of the page.169  Even in the context of 
electronic contracting, there is a “dearth of settled law” regarding 
browsewrap agreements.170  Underlying the dispute over the 
enforceability of browsewrap agreements and their validity as 
contracts is the lack of notice given to users of the actual terms 
contained within the agreements.171  The hyperlink at the bottom of 
a webpage directing users to the terms of use is often insufficient 
to give the consumers actual notice of the terms of use they are 
accepting through use of the webpage.172  Because of the weakness 
of notice in browsewrap agreements, courts have devised means of 
protecting consumers but are generally unwilling to extend the 
same protection to businesses that repeatedly access a website.173 
Courts generally find that browsewrap agreements are 
unenforceable when a consumer sues a website to avoid liability 
under the terms of the browsewrap agreement.174  However, most 
often, browsewrap litigation surrounds a company’s misuse of a 
competitor’s website,175 and in these cases, courts will generally 
 
Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. 
LRP Publ’ns, Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-1859, 2000 WL 1468535, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 
2000); Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519 
(W.D. Pa. 2000); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 307 
(Wash. 2000)). 
 168 Ian A. Rambarran, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They Are Wrapped Up to Be? 
2–3 (Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 1885, 2006), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1885. 
 169 Id. at 5. 
 170 Id. at 3 (citing Christina Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied 
Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279, 289 (2003)). 
 171 See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 172 Rambarran, supra note 168, at 5 (noting that “browse agreements do not have the 
same notice guarantees” as other forms of electronic contracting because the terms of the 
agreement are “incorporated by reference”). 
 173 See, e.g., Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 150, at 459, 472–73. 
 174 Id. at 462 (citing Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 556–
57 (1st Cir. 2005); Waters v. Earthlink, Inc., 91 F. App’x 697, 698 (1st Cir. 2003); 
Specht, 306 F.3d at 35–38). 
 175 Id. at 472–73.  
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enforce a browsewrap agreement against the defendant 
company.176  This tends to happen when a company exploits 
another company’s user’s information for its benefit, either to 
collect contact information for potential customers or to directly 
contact users, in violation of the terms of use agreement.  The 
federal courts likely treat these agreements with greater deference 
to the agreement itself because of an underlying presumption that 
businesses are more sophisticated parties than the average 
consumers, and if they are seeking to profit from a given website, 
they should be aware of the terms of engaging the website. 
Clickwrap agreements are the most widely used type of 
electronic terms of use agreements and the most consistently 
upheld as enforceable by courts.177  Clickwrap agreements are 
terms of use agreements that require the user to click a link that 
says “I Agree” or otherwise give affirmative consent to the terms 
of use before accessing the website’s content.178  By forcing the 
user to scroll through the agreement, or at least presenting him or 
her with the agreement and requiring action on his or her part, the 
clickwrap agreements avoid the notice issues present with the 
browsewrap agreements.179 
In 2007, the American Bar Association promulgated a series of 
recommendations to avoid legal issues with electronic contracting.  
Its “legal best practices for electronic contracting” identified four 
“bottom line” steps for forming legally binding online contracts:180 
1. The user must have adequate notice that the 
proposed terms exist; 
 
 176 Id. at 460 (citing Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428–30 (2d Cir. 
2004); Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825 JW, 2005 WL 756610, at 
*5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 
CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003); Pollstar v. 
Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000)). 
 177 See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 150, at 459.  
 178 Id.; see also Rambarran, supra note 168, at 7 (“Click-through agreements require 
users to assent affirmatively to terms before downloading or using a service or product.”). 
 179 See Rambarran, supra note 168, at 7–8. 
 180 ThinkingOpen, How Do I Build an Enforceable Online Agreement?—Not (Always) 
the Way SalesForce.com or Google Would, http://thinkingopen.wordpress.com/2008/03/ 
08/how-do-i-build-an-enforceable-online-contract-not-always-what-salesforcecom-or-go 
ogle-would-do (Mar. 8, 2008). 
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2. The user must have a meaningful opportunity to 
review the terms; 
3. The user must have adequate notice that taking a 
specified, optional action manifests assent to the 
terms; and 
4. The user must, in fact, take that action.181 
Clickwrap agreements generally satisfy these requirements by 
presenting the user with the terms of use before allowing him or 
her to access content on or interact with the website.  Indeed, until 
recently, nearly every time a court faced a clickwrap agreement, it 
found it enforceable and binding upon the parties.182  However, 
recently there has been tension and disagreement between federal 
courts and circuits on the issue of enforceability. 
b) Contract Doctrines Implicated by Online Contracting 
There are several important doctrines of contract law that are 
implicated by the use of online contracting.  First, the doctrine of 
third party beneficiary is particularly important with regards to 
social networking websites and user-generated content.  Second, a 
contract voidable for unconscionable terms is also pertinent to this 
discussion.  Finally, contracts voidable for unfair bargaining power 
are also at issue in this discussion. 
The third party beneficiary doctrine is a contract doctrine that 
allows third parties to a contract to sue and enforce promises or 
duties intended to protect them even though they are not a party to 
 
 181 Id. 
 182 See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 150, at 459 (“Every court to consider the 
issue has found ‘clickwrap’ licenses, in which an online user clicks ‘I agree’ to standard 
form terms, enforceable.” (citing Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638–39 (8th 
Cir. 2005); Salco Distribs., L.L.C. v. iCode, Inc., No. 8:05-CV-642-T-27TGW, 2006 WL 
449156, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2006); Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive 
Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756, 781–83 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Mortgage Plus, Inc. v. 
DocMagic, Inc., No. 03-2592, 2004 WL 2331918, at *4–5 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 2004); i-
Sys., Inc. v. Softwares, Inc., No. Civ. 02-1951(JRT/FLN), 2004 WL 742082, at *6 (D. 
Minn. Mar. 29, 2004); Novak v. Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451–52 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 
330–31 (D. Mass. 2002); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C-98-20064JW, 
1998 WL 388389, at *3–9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (granting a preliminary injunction 
assuming such an agreement was enforceable without reviewing the merits); Caspi v. 
Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532–33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999))). 
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the contract.183  One requirement is that the contract must have 
been made for their benefit, thereby largely limiting the doctrine’s 
availability to third parties.184  Despite several attempts by 
litigants, the third party beneficiary doctrine has yet to succeed in 
court to enforce rights based on a terms of use agreement.185 
Some courts have found certain clauses of the terms of use 
agreements unenforceable because they were unconscionable or 
ambiguous.  Courts will occasionally invoke “unconscionability” 
as a reason to “refuse to enforce oppressive bargains on grounds of 
substantive unconscionability.”186  Ambiguous terms are terms that 
lack a sufficiently clear definition or context within the contract to 
be enforceable by courts.187  As will be discussed later, courts 
struggle to apply traditional contract principles to electronic 
contracts as the contemporary form of contract and methods of 
assent used by the parties clash sharply with older notions of 
contract law.188 
Social networking websites exist in a strange tension with their 
users.  Networks like Facebook.com, Loopt.com, and 
YingYang.com require users to contribute to their websites in 
order to be a “value added” service.  The term “value added” 
means that as more users contribute to the site with pictures, 
information, and applications used exclusively by the site and its 
users, the site becomes more valuable, and, in turn, more used, 
visited, and profitable.  The concept is referred to as “sticky” 
content because content generated by social networking users that 
is exclusive to that site sticks to the site and is what draws more 
 
 183 See generally PERILLO, supra note 130, at 663–67. 
 184 Id.  
 185 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); Kremen v. 
Network Solutions, Inc., 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Am. Plaza Corp., No. 
08 Civ. 8980(PKC), 2009 WL 1158829 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2009); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 
No. Civ.A. 00-3163(JCL), 2005 WL 1683696 (D.N.J. June 24, 2005); Morrison v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 930 (N.D. Ind. 2001); see also Posting of Thomas O’Toole 
to E-Commerce and Tech Law Blog, Online, Third-Party Beneficiary Claims Are Likely 
Losers, http://pblog.bna.com/techlaw/2009/05/online-thirdparty-beneficiary-claims-are-
likely-losers.html (May 1, 2009). 
 186 PERILLO, supra note 130, at 382. 
 187 See id. at 382–87. 
 188 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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users to use the site.189  Social networking websites challenge 
traditional notions of ownership and consumer-owner 
relationships.190 
The United States legal system has had a long tradition of 
defining property and ownership based on the efficient allocation 
of resources.  The Lockean Proviso is a famous edict by one of the 
seventeenth century’s greatest political philosophers, John Locke, 
and is a fairly traditional view on what creates ownership.191  The 
Lockean Proviso argues that the fruits of one’s labor are one’s own 
possession.192  In other words, a person who works on something 
can claim at least partial ownership of it. 
Social networks challenge this understanding of ownership 
because users are constantly creating, adding to, and producing 
content on social networking websites, yet they do not own the 
material or a portion of the site.  Rather, the site, by the terms of 
agreement, co-opts the information and declares ownership of it.  
Accordingly, users add value to the website; indeed, user-
generated content on sites such as Facebook is what makes the site 
attractive for other users and yet, users never own anything they 
add to the site.193 
Ultimately, understanding privacy rights and a social 
networking site’s freedom to use personal information posted or 
shared by users requires an understanding of both the history of 
United States privacy law and contract law.194  Congress has in 
only rare instances enacted laws codifying privacy rights and only 
 
 189 NetLingo, Sticky Content, http://www.netlingo.com/word/sticky-content.php (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2010) (defining “sticky content” as “[i]nformation or features on a Web 
site that gives users a compelling reason to revisit it frequently”). 
 190 See Croll, supra note 111.  
 191 See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas P. 
Peardon ed., 1952). 
 192 Id. at ch. 5 § 27. 
 193 In fact, in a recent case, Finkel v. Facebook, No. 102578/09, 2009 WL 3240365 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 2009), it appears the plaintiffs alleged for the first time anywhere 
that immunity should not attach when the social networking defendant (in this case, 
Facebook) actually gains from value-added of user contributions. Id.  While the case was 
dismissed, id., this line of reasoning could have important consequences for the future of 
immunity litigation under 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006), which generally gives immunity to 
social networking sites. 
 194 See discussion supra Part I. 
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on very specific issues, such as the ECPA.  Yet, courts continue to 
reinterpret privacy rights, beginning with Griswold and continuing 
through today.  Courts have been attempting to use traditional 
common law principles to provide greater protection for privacy 
than legislatively afforded.  The use of personal information by 
social networks gives rise to a host of new privacy considerations.  
The next Part of this Note will examine two proposals to address 
the host of issues raised by social networks and location-based 
technology. 
II.  THE COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY APPROACHES 
Concerns for the privacy of users of social networking sites 
have led both courts and legislatures to begin to adopt and apply a 
set of ad hoc rules to provide greater protection for users.  There 
are two principal ways that courts and commentators have 
approached the issue of increasing privacy protections for social 
networking site users.  First, courts have begun using a common 
law approach to strike down terms of use agreements as 
unenforceable when the site has not demonstrated sufficient notice 
procedures or when the terms of use agreement has been drafted 
too broadly.195  Alternatively, commentators have taken cues from 
Canada and the European Union to suggest adopting a legislative 
approach to enhancing privacy controls in cyberspace.196  
Advocates of a legislative overhaul tend to suggest amending the 
ECPA as a legal mechanism to provide consumers with greater 
protection and control over the content they post on social 
networking sites.197 
This Part first looks at several recent court cases that have 
struck down terms of use agreements as unenforceable.  Parsing 
these decisions is crucial for social networking websites in order to 
understand what is acceptable in drafting terms of use agreements.  
 
 195 See discussion infra Part II.A (describing recent federal courts’ holdings that relied 
on common law doctrines to strike down terms of use agreements as unenforceable and 
void). 
 196 See infra notes 292–306 and accompanying text (explaining recent international 
edicts on privacy and arguments for amending the ECPA). 
 197 See infra notes 266–79 and accompanying text. 
C08_TERENZI_FINAL_051910 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2010  12:46 PM 
1084 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:1049 
Additionally, this Part looks at arguments by commentators 
pushing for a myriad of common law solutions to privacy 
concerns.  Next, this Part collects various academic articles and 
privacy directives issued by other countries and attempts to distill 
the essence of what is being proposed as potential changes to the 
privacy law landscape regarding terms of use agreements. 
A. The Common Law Approach to Increasing Online Privacy 
Protection 
Courts have taken the issue of terms of use agreements as they 
relate to privacy protections rather seriously and have begun to 
hold terms of use agreements unenforceable, especially when the 
alleged harm is a privacy infringement.  Part I.A will use three 
cases as examples of the types of limits courts impose on terms of 
use agreements—Harris v. Blockbuster, Inc.,198 Specht v. 
Netscape,199 and Hines v. Overstock.com.200  Read together, these 
cases demonstrate a shift by the federal judiciary towards 
increasing consumer protection at the expense of web-businesses 
when privacy concerns are implicated.  Courts tend to be more 
aggressive in interpreting terms of use agreements to the benefit of 
the user when the user alleges a breach of privacy.  Terms of use 
agreements that precedent suggests should be binding are 
scrutinized more carefully when privacy concerns are involved. 
The holding of these cases suggests a shift towards a more 
interventionist approach to terms of use agreements, transforming 
the Internet into an area increasingly regulated by the courts. 
1. Specht v. Netscape 
Specht v. Netscape was the first decision by a court to 
invalidate a browsewrap agreement, and it involved allegations of 
privacy infringement.201  That the court chose this case to 
invalidate a browsewrap agreement suggests that, as in Harris,202 
the court had identified a void in privacy protection and stretched 
 
 198 622 F. Supp. 2d 396 (N.D. Tex. 2009).  
 199 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 200 No. 09 CV 991(SJ), 2009 WL 2876667 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009). 
 201 Specht, 306 F.3d at 17. 
 202 Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 399. 
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contract principles to remedy that legislative inadequacy.  Specht is 
particularly noteworthy because although the controlling precedent 
in the Second Circuit would have pushed the court to enforce the 
terms of use agreement at issue, allegations of breach of privacy 
seem to have forced the court to ignore precedent and invalidate 
the agreement.203  In other words, the court attempted to afford 
special protection to the privacy rights of the plaintiff, despite 
precedent. 
In Specht, the plaintiffs claimed that software downloaded 
from the defendant’s website “invaded plaintiffs’ privacy by 
clandestinely transmitting personal information to the software 
provider.”204  As in both Harris and Overstock, the court limited its 
holding to the enforceability of the arbitration provision, ultimately 
invalidating it and establishing strong precedent for future terms of 
use agreement litigation where privacy interests might be at stake.  
Then-Judge Sotomayor wrote the opinion of the court, holding that 
the user “did not unambiguously manifest assent to the arbitration 
provision contained in the license terms.”205 
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated the ECPA 
by transmitting private information about their use of the 
defendant’s software.206  The plaintiffs claimed that when they 
installed the software, they also installed a cookie, “an 
identification tag for future communications,” which allowed the 
defendants to illegally eavesdrop on their Internet and computer 
usage.207  Essentially, the plaintiffs claimed that by installing a 
cookie on their computer, defendants profited by being able to 
track a user of the defendants’ program’s page visits beyond what 
could have been expected. 
The court took particular issue with the lack of notice of terms 
of use.208  The court noted that “no clickwrap presentation 
 
 203 See Specht, 306 F.3d at 36–37. 
 204 Id. at 17. 
 205 Id. at 20. 
 206 Id. at 21.  
 207 Id. (“These processes, plaintiffs claim, constituted unlawful ‘eavesdropping’ on 
users of Netscape’s software products as well as on Internet websites from which users 
employing SmartDownload downloaded files.”). 
 208 Id. at 22. 
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accompanied” the downloading of the challenged program, 
SmartDownload.209  Describing the advantages of a clickwrap 
agreement, the court noted the differences between a typical 
clickwrap agreement and the notice described by the plaintiffs in 
SmartDownload’s terms of use agreement.210  After downloading 
the program, “these plaintiffs encountered no further information 
about the plug-in program or the existence of license terms 
governing its use.”211  Noting that “the sole reference” to the terms 
of use agreement was a text box on the following page, the court 
condemned the lack of notice by concluding that the software did 
not require the plaintiffs “to express unambiguous assent to that 
program’s license agreement nor even to view the license terms or 
become aware of their existence before proceeding with the invited 
download of the free plug-in program.”212 
The court proceeded with a lengthy discussion of controlling 
precedent, noting that all the cases cited by the defendants “were 
distinguishable on the facts” because they involved “paper 
contracting.”213  The court noted that the “world of paper 
contracting” was different, separate, and essentially required 
different common law principles than “online transactions.”214  
Indeed, the court devoted an entire section to explaining why the 
cases the defendants relied on were not, in its view, applicable to 
online transactions.215  Yet, the court used the term 
“eavesdropping,” a word with deep colonial roots,216 to describe 
the placing of a cookie on a computer, thereby cognitively linking 
in-person eavesdropping and online eavesdropping.  In essence, the 
court allowed framing-era privacy language to have the same 
meaning in both online and in-person scenarios, but required 
applicable standards for contract interpretation to depend on 
 
 209 Id. at 23. 
 210 Id. at 22–24. 
 211 Id. at 23. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. at 33.  
 214 See id. at 31–33. 
 215 See id. at 33–35. 
 216 Id. at 21, 37, 38 (appearing four times in the court’s decision, the word 
“eavesdropping” received positive recognition by the court); see supra note 29 and 
accompanying text. 
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whether the contract had been agreed to online or in-person.217  
The refusal of the court to allow paper contracting cases to be used 
by the defense along with its willingness to allow the plaintiffs to 
freely interchange concepts typically associated with corporeal 
privacy infringements218 suggests that the court was making 
allowances in the interest of providing enhanced protection for 
online privacy.  This case is important for online companies 
because it shows that courts will occasionally use inconsistent 
reasoning as a means of ensuring protection of a user’s privacy. 
2. Harris v. Blockbuster 
In Harris v. Blockbuster, Inc., the federal court for the 
Northern District of Texas held that the terms of use agreement in 
that case was “illusory and unenforceable” and denied 
Blockbuster’s motion to compel arbitration as stipulated in the 
terms of use agreement.219  The plaintiff alleged violations by 
Blockbuster, Inc. of the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”)220 
resulting from Blockbuster’s participation in the Facebook Beacon 
Program.221  Ultimately, the court held that the terms of use 
agreement written by Blockbuster and agreed to by the plaintiff 
was unenforceable because of a lack of adequate consideration and 
unconscionable terms.222 
The Facebook Beacon program generated a lot of 
controversy.223  As discussed earlier, it was a program initiated by 
Facebook through which other websites could create a relationship 
with Facebook; a Facebook user’s activity on another website 
therefore would be broadcast as a news story on Facebook and 
appear in a public feed on the site.224  Users could opt out of the 
program, but essentially, the privacy concerns expressed by 
Facebook users ended up scuttling the program.225  However, 
 
 217 See id. at 37–38. 
 218 See id. at 31–33. 
 219 622 F. Supp. 2d 396, 400 (2009).  
 220 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006). 
 221 Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 397. 
 222 Id. at 399. 
 223 See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text.  
 224 See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text. 
 225 See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text. 
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Harris serves as an example of the concerns many social 
networking websites have as a result of Facebook’s Beacon 
program. 
The plaintiff in Harris alleged that Blockbuster’s agreement 
with Facebook, which would allow movie rental choices to be 
disseminated publicly on Facebook, violated the VPPA.226  The 
Harris decision did not reach the merits of the claim as it only 
ruled on the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.227  The 
plaintiff, a woman named Cathryn Elaine Harris, brought suit 
against Blockbuster initially as a class action suit, seeking the 
maximum allowed $2,500 per infringement as stipulated in the 
VPPA.228  Blockbuster sought to compel arbitration and thereby 
avoid a messy public battle over its role in the privacy debacle 
created, in part, by the Beacon program.229 
Blockbuster argued that its terms of use agreement, a clickwrap 
agreement that Harris had clicked through, specifically authorized 
the company to use the information in the ways the plaintiff 
challenged.230  Blockbuster’s terms of use agreement included the 
following language: 
Blockbuster may at any time, and at its sole 
discretion, modify these Terms and Conditions of 
Use, including without limitation the Privacy 
Policy, with or without notice.  Such modifications 
will be effective immediately upon posting.  You 
agree to review these Terms and Conditions of Use 
periodically and your continued use of this Site 
following such modifications will indicate your 
 
 226 Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 397. 
 227 Id. 
 228 See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2)(A) (2006); Caroline McCarthy, Blockbuster Sued over 
Role in Facebook’s Beacon Ad Program, CNET NEWS, Apr. 17, 2008, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-9921496-36.html. 
 229 Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 398.  
 230 Id. at 397 (“As a precondition to joining Blockbuster Online, customers were 
required to click on a box certifying that they had read and agreed to the Terms and 
Conditions.”); see also Posting of Thomas O’Toole to E-Commerce and Tech Law Blog, 
‘Illusory’ Contract Looks Awfully Familiar, http://pblog.bna.com/techlaw/2009/04/ 
illusory-contract-looks-awfully-familiar-.html (Apr. 20, 2009) (describing Blockbuster’s 
terms of agreement as “terms that were assented to via a mouse-click”).  
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acceptance of these modified Terms and Conditions 
of Use.  If you do not agree to any modification of 
these Terms and Conditions of Use, you must 
immediately stop using this Site.231 
The court relied on precedent to rule that the language in the 
above clause was too broad, one-sided, and unfair to be 
enforceable.232  Specifically, the court highlighted the terms “at its 
sole discretion” and “at any time” to hold that Blockbuster had 
gone both too far in its reservations of rights to unilaterally amend 
the contract and not far enough in granting the plaintiff notice of 
the changes.233 
The court relied heavily on the Fifth Circuit case Morrison v. 
Amway Corporation234 to reach its decision in Harris.  In 
Morrison, the Fifth Circuit invalidated an arbitration provision 
similar to the one at issue in Harris.235  Morrison involved a 
defendant company, a seller of home goods, that was sued by 
several plaintiffs for various torts, and sought to enforce an 
arbitration clause against the plaintiffs.236  The plaintiffs agreed to 
the arbitration clause in their contracts with the defendant.237  The 
agreement, similar to Blockbuster’s, included a clause allowing the 
defendant to unilaterally alter the contract; “the only express 
limitation on that unilateral right [was] published notice.”238  This 
led the court to suggest that the amendments made by the 
defendant could be applicable to events occurring before the 
amendments were even published.239  The Morrison court 
distinguished the amendment clause from a similar one in In re 
Halliburton Co.,240 which “specifically limited the defendant’s 
ability to apply changes to the agreement.”241 
 
 231 Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 398–99.  
 232 Id. at 399. 
 233 Id. at 398–99. 
 234 517 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2008).  
 235 Id. at 257; Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 397–98.  
 236 Morrison, 517 F.3d at 252–53. 
 237 Id. at 253. 
 238 Id. at 254.  
 239 Id. 
 240 80 S.W.3d 566, 569–70 (Tex. 2002).  
 241 Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 398 (citing In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d at 569–70). 
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Indeed, the lack of limitations on Blockbuster’s terms of 
agreement was determinative in the Harris case.242  The fact that 
Blockbuster could change the contract at any time and apply those 
changes to events that occurred before the changes were made 
created an illusory contract, according to the court.243  The court 
then extended the Morrison rule by saying that the contract is 
illusory “even when no retroactive modification has been 
attempted.”244  In denying the defendant’s motion to compel 
individual arbitration based on the terms of use agreement that the 
plaintiff had accepted,245 the court broadened the scope of the 
Morrison ruling and left the enforceability of similar agreements in 
jeopardy. 
The Harris decision reverberated throughout the Internet and 
legal community.  It is far too early to tell if Harris will have any 
long-term effect on terms of use agreement drafting or on privacy 
litigation, but it seems like it may have such an impact, based on 
the court’s reasoning that the real concern here was privacy.  The 
court used an attack on the terms of agreement contract to address 
an underlying concern with privacy.  Harris is a warning sign for 
social networking websites to draft their terms of agreement 
carefully and attempt to tailor them narrowly to avoid the kinds of 
problems faced by Blockbuster. 
 
 242 See id. at 399 (“The Court concludes that the Blockbuster arbitration provision is 
illusory for the same reasons as that in Morrison.  Here, as in Morrison, there is nothing 
in the Terms and Conditions that prevents Blockbuster from unilaterally changing any 
part of the contract other than providing that such changes will not take effect until 
posted on the website. There are likewise no ‘Halliburton type savings clauses,’ as there 
is ‘nothing to suggest that once published the amendment would be inapplicable to 
disputes arising, or arising out of events occurring, before such publication.’  The Fifth 
Circuit in Morrison noted the lack of an ‘express exemption’ of the ability to unilaterally 
modify all rules, which the Blockbuster agreement also does not contain.  The 
Blockbuster contract only states that modifications ‘will be effective immediately upon 
posting,’ and the natural reading of that clause does not limit application of the 
modifications to earlier disputes.”).  
243  Id. 
 244 Id. at 400.  
 245 Id. 
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3. Hines v. Overstock.com 
In Hines v. Overstock.com, the federal court for the Eastern 
District for New York denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
Cynthia Hines’s claims for breach of contract against 
Overstock.com because it found the terms of use agreement invalid 
and unenforceable.246  As in Harris, the arbitration clause of 
Overstock.com’s terms of use agreement was the focal point of the 
court’s analysis.247  However, the case differs from Harris because 
rather than holding that the contract was illusory, the court held 
that the plaintiff did not receive notice of the terms within the 
contract sufficient to create a meeting of the minds or actual 
assent.248 
Ms. Hines commenced a class action suit against 
Overstock.com for breach of contract, fraud, and violations of New 
York General Business Law sections 349 and 350.249  The claims 
originated from a thirty dollar “restocking fee” the defendant 
charged Ms. Hines when she tried to return a vacuum she 
purchased from Overstock.com.250  She claimed that she had never 
been notified or warned of the potential charge.251  Overstock.com, 
Inc. responded with a motion to dismiss or stay for arbitration or 
transfer to the venue stipulated in the terms of use agreement.252  
The relevant portion of the terms of use agreement is as follows: 
“All retail purchases from Overstock are conducted through 
Overstock’s Internet website. When an individual accesses the 
website, he or she accepts Overstock’s terms, conditions and 
policies, which govern all of Overstock’s customer purchases.”253  
Plaintiff alleged that the placement of the terms of use agreement, 
 
 246 No. 09 CV 991(SJ), 2009 WL 2876667, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009). 
 247 Id. at *1–2.  
 248 Id. at *3 (“In the instant case, it is clear that Plaintiff had no actual notice of the 
Terms and Conditions of Use.”). 
 249 Id. at *1.  
 250 Id. (“After receiving the vacuum, Plaintiff returned it to Defendant and was 
reimbursed the full amount she had paid for it, minus a $30.00 restocking fee.”). 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. 
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on the bottom of the webpage, did not constitute actual notice of 
the terms she agreed to by entering the website.254 
The court essentially agreed, taking particular issue with the 
way in which Overstock.com presented its terms of use agreement 
to customers.255  Referring to decades of case law, the court 
maintained that a contract required “a ‘meeting of the minds’ and 
‘a manifestation of mutual assent.’”256  The court distinguished 
clickwrap agreements from browsewrap agreements,257 providing 
that “courts consider primarily ‘whether a website user has actual 
or constructive knowledge of a site’s terms and conditions prior to 
using the site.’”258  The court then cited several other Second 
Circuit decisions finding browsewrap agreements non-binding 
when the user “respond[ed] to an offer that did not carry an 
immediately visible notice of the existence of license terms or 
required unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms.”259 
 
 254 Id. (“Plaintiff affirms, however, that she ‘never had any notice that disputes with 
Overstock.com require mandatory arbitration in Salt Lake City, Utah.’ Plaintiff affirms 
that when she accessed Overstock’s website to purchase the vacuum, she was never made 
aware of the Terms and Conditions; specifically, Plaintiff avers that: ‘Because of this 
lawsuit, I later learned that if you scroll down to the end of the website page or pages, 
there is in smaller print placed between ‘privacy policy’ and Overstock.com’s registered 
trademark, the words ‘site user terms and conditions.’  I did not scroll down to the end of 
the page(s) because it was not necessary to do so, as I was directed each step of the way 
to click on to a bar to take me to the next step to complete the purchase.’”). 
 255 See id. at *3 (“Hines therefore lacked notice of the Terms and Conditions because 
the website did not prompt her to review the Terms and Conditions and because the link 
to the Terms and Conditions was not prominently displayed so as to provide reasonable 
notice of the Terms and Conditions.”). 
 256 Id. at *2 (citing Express Indus. & Terminal Corp. v. N.Y. Dep’t Transp., 715 N.E.2d 
1050, 1050 (N.Y. 1999); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Weigner, 127 P.3d 1241, 1242–43 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2005); R.J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 819–20 (Utah 1952)). 
 257 Id. (“Unlike a clickwrap agreement, a browsewrap agreement ‘does not require the 
user to manifest assent to the terms and conditions expressly . . . [a] party instead gives 
his assent simply by using the website.’” (quoting Sw. Airlines Co. v. Boardfirst, L.L.C., 
No. 06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 483761, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007))). 
 258 Id. (quoting Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002)).  
 259 Id. at *3 (quoting Specht, 306 F.3d at 23); see also Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 
356 F.3d 393, 402–03 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding browsewrap agreement enforceable 
because the user conceded actual notice of the terms of use agreement); Motise v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 563, 564–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (refusing to find notice where 
the terms of service were not presented to the plaintiff as an ISP user). 
C08_TERENZI_FINAL_051910 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2010  12:46 PM 
2010] FRIENDING PRIVACY 1093 
Perhaps most interestingly, the court recognized that “very 
little is required to form a contract nowadays—but this alone does 
not suffice,” referring to the statement within the terms of use 
agreement that users would be bound by the terms and conditions 
of use via their use of the website alone.260  First, the court 
distinguished this case from other browsewrap agreements in 
which the notice that users would be bound by the terms of use 
agreement merely by using the site was more prominently 
displayed.261  The fact that the court admitted that very little was 
required to form a contract, however, was a backdoor victory for 
website owners and terms of use agreements. 
Taken together, these cases stand for the proposition that courts 
will look at terms of use agreements across a spectrum of 
accessibility and look at them potentially more restrictively when 
privacy concerns are implicated by the plaintiff’s claims.  On the 
least-likely-to-be-upheld end of the spectrum are terms of use 
agreements that are not prominently displayed on the website and 
which bind users of the website without notice.262  On the other 
end of the spectrum are prominently displayed clickwrap 
agreements that require the user to scroll through the agreement 
and do not reserve the right to unilaterally alter the agreement.263  
Harris is the first decision to declare that an online terms of use 
clickwrap agreement is unenforceable, and in fact, several 
decisions from other circuits seem inconsistent with the court’s 
analysis in Harris.264  The court allowed the plaintiff to pursue a 
claim that required an expansion of its contract doctrine because 
the injury alleged was an infringement of the plaintiff’s privacy 
rights.265  Accordingly, the Harris decision could breathe life into 
the widely backed argument in academia for courts and legislatures 
to expand privacy protection with a modified common law 
approach. 
 
 260 Hines, 2009 WL 2876667, at *3. 
 261 Id. (citing Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 121–22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) 
(finding sufficient notice where three pages completed by the plaintiff had statements 
advising users that they would be bound by the use of the site)).  
 262 See id.  
 263 See, e.g., Harris v. Blockbuster, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396, 398 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
 264 Id.; see supra note 182 and accompanying text.  
 265 Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 397, 399. 
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B. Increase Privacy Online by Amending the ECPA 
Advocates of increasing Internet privacy protections 
legislatively argue that the federal government should amend the 
ECPA or otherwise expand legislation to protect a user’s basic 
expectation of privacy.266  Pressure on Congress to codify and 
protect a user’s rights to privacy on social networking websites has 
found widespread support from academic circles and Canada and 
the European Union,267 both of which have stronger codified 
protections for Internet users.  Proponents of a legislative overhaul 
of privacy law in the United States argue that existing legal 
loopholes and immunities provide protection to only a very select 
subset of Internet users, which often does not include those who 
are most vulnerable to infringements of their privacy rights.268  
Ultimately, those on this side of the debate claim that the free 
market is not an effective safeguard of people’s privacy and that it 
is the government’s responsibility to provide a uniform and 
effective legal framework to both protect the consumer and restrain 
the company from exploiting outdated assumptions of privacy in 
the United States.269 
Recently, there has been an increasing amount of attention paid 
to the ECPA as a growing number of academics suggest that 
Congress should use this law as a baseline from which to update 
privacy protection online.270  Professor Joel R. Reidenberg has 
written about the lack of a coherent privacy framework in the 
United States, calling privacy rights “a fractured and incomplete 
right in American law”271 and calling out the “sophistry of U.S. 
 
 266 See, e.g., Oyama, supra note 92; Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy 
in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771 (1999) [hereinafter Reidenberg, 
Restoring Americans’ Privacy]. 
 267 See, e.g., Carly Brandenburg, The Newest Way to Screen Job Applicants: A Social 
Networker’s Nightmare, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 597, 614 (2008) (“The solution to this 
privacy threat can best be resolved by the courts and the legislature.”).  For a discussion 
on Canada and European Union Initiatives on Privacy, see infra notes 279–92. 
 268 See Oyama, supra note 92, at 523. 
 269 Id. 
 270 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 108, at 1208; Oyama, supra note 92, at 501; Joel R. 
Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 879 (2003) 
[hereinafter Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs].  
 271 Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs, supra note 270, at 879. 
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privacy policy.”272  Reidenberg argues that the current patchwork 
American legislative scheme to protect privacy is insufficient.273  
At issue is the fact that expectations of privacy and privacy rights 
take various forms and require various degrees of protection 
against infringement, a point the current legislative framework 
completely ignores.274 
For the purposes of this Note, Professor Reidenberg’s 
discussion of “personal or private” wrongs is particularly 
relevant.275  Reidenberg argues that there are at least three personal 
privacy wrongs requiring legislative attention: (1) “intrusive 
information practices,” (2) “misuse of personal information,” and 
(3) “outrageous and noxious data disclosures.”276  Relying on 
“shifting expectations” and increased public concern for privacy, 
Reidenberg argues that the time is ripe for the U.S. federal 
government to address privacy expectations on the Internet and 
provide legislative avenues for redress of privacy right 
infringements.277 
Central to the argument for government intervention on 
Internet privacy is a lack of faith in the free market’s ability to 
account for the void in formal privacy protections.  Despite a 
tradition of Internet company self-regulation, advocates of 
increased government in the social networking space argue that 
without full disclosure of the use, acquisition, and transmission of 
personal information, the Internet is in the midst of “a classic case 
of market failure.”278  Echoes of this argument resonate 
internationally.  In the past several years, the European Union and 
 
 272 Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy, supra note 266, at 773. 
 273 Id. at 772 (“For years, the United States has relied on narrow, ad hoc legal rights 
enacted in response to particular scandals involving abusive information practices.  The 
approach has led to incoherence and significant gaps in the protection of citizens’ 
privacy.”). 
 274 Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs, supra note 270, at 878. 
 275 Id. at 881. 
 276 Id. at 881–82.  
 277 Id. at 879; see Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy, supra note 266, at 771–
72 (“During the last few years, an overwhelming majority of Americans report that they 
have lost control of their personal information and that current laws are not strong enough 
to protect their privacy.”). 
 278 Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy, supra note 266, at 775. 
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Canada have tightened privacy laws and are pressuring the United 
States to do the same.279 
Notably, in August of 2009, the Canadian government 
effectively forced Facebook to rewrite its privacy policy to bring it 
in line with Canadian privacy laws.280  Following a complaint from 
the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, the Privacy 
Commissioner’s Office investigated Facebook’s privacy policies 
and found them lacking in conformity with Canada’s primary 
privacy laws, the Privacy Act and the Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”).281  The 
PIPEDA governs how private sector organizations collect,282 use, 
and disclose personal information while the Privacy Act focuses on 
government-user data collection on the Internet.283 
Four issues were of particular concern to the Privacy 
Commissioner.  First, as discussed earlier,284 control over third 
party application developers and their access to personal 
information was severely lacking on Facebook, according to the 
Privacy Commissioner.285  Secondly, Facebook was unclear about 
the difference between deactivating an account, whereupon 
Facebook continues to hold the user’s information in its servers, 
and deleting an account, where the user effectively erases his or 
her data from Facebook’s servers.286  Third, the Privacy 
Commissioner claimed that Facebook did not sufficiently 
guarantee the privacy of non-users’ information, which is posted as 
 
 279 See, e.g., Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Announces Privacy Improvements in 
Response to Recommendations by Canadian Privacy Commissioner (Aug. 27, 2009), 
available at http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=118816 [hereinafter 
Facebook, Privacy Improvements]. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Facebook Agrees to Address Canadian Privacy Commissioner’s Concerns, NET 
NEWS PUBLISHER, Aug. 27, 2009, http://www.netnewspublisher.com/facebook-agrees-to-
address-canadian-privacy-commissioners-concerns/ [hereinafter Facebook Agrees]. 
 282 The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), 
2000 S.C., ch. 5 (Can.). 
 283 Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P-21 (1985); Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada, Mandate and Mission, http://www.priv.gc.ca/aboutUs/mm_e.cfm#contenttop 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
 284 See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text.  
 285 See Facebook Agrees, supra note 281. 
 286 Id. 
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a result of an associate’s use of the site.287  Finally, Facebook was 
unclear in its privacy policy as to how it would handle the death of 
a user and how friends could continue to use the user’s profile as a 
memorial.288  In reaction to the Privacy Commissioner’s report, 
Facebook agreed to rewrite its privacy policy and “retrofit” its site 
to conform to the Privacy Commissioner’s suggestions.289  
Importantly, Facebook’s changes affected its site no matter where 
the user was located.290  Therefore, Facebook’s improvements to 
its privacy policy, enacted at the behest of the Canadian 
government, improved the privacy policy for users throughout the 
world.291 
The establishment of Canada’s Privacy Commissioner Office is 
part of an international movement intended to strengthen privacy 
rights for Internet users via government legislation and 
intervention.292  In Europe, privacy is a fundamental human right, 
based on a concept of dignity, beginning with the European 
Union’s Directive on Data Protection of 1995, which required that 
each country that was part of the European Union pass a national 
privacy law and create a Data Protection Authority to protect its 
citizens’ privacy.293  Indeed, as some have suggested, compared to 
the United States privacy law regime, the European Union’s efforts 
and legislative scheme is an aggressive, comprehensive attempt to 
both reign in social networking sites’ use of their users’ personal 
information and protect the European citizenry.294 
Comparing the amalgam of federal and state laws that 
represent the body of United States privacy law with other 
 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. 
 292 See, e.g., Wayne Madsen, David L. Sobel, Marc Rotenberg & David Banisar, 
Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey of Encryption Policy, 16 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 475 (1998). 
 293 Council Directive 95/46, Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 35 (EC); 
Sullivan, supra note 23.  
 294 See Sullivan, supra note 23 (titling one section of the article “piecemeal approach 
vs. comprehensive law” and expounding upon the differences between U.S. and E.U. 
privacy law). 
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international systems does indeed make both European and 
Canadian efforts appear more substantial and more cohesive.295  
Nonetheless, even advocates of an internationalist approach to 
United States privacy law admit that assessing the impact of 
Europe’s increased privacy protections is hard to measure.296  
However, that limitation does not tend to deter proponents, such as 
Marc Rotenberg of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, who 
call for a similarly encompassing United States privacy regime.297  
The European Union looks at privacy as a “fundamental human 
right,” and has a strict enforcement procedure whereby each 
country is required to maintain a federal office called the Data 
Protection Authority to enforce the 1995 directive.298  Further, the 
European Union goes to great pains to ensure that all databases are 
registered and that consumers have the right to periodically review 
the information collected about them by private actors.299  Notably, 
however, the European Union does not have a system set up to 
ensure citizens equal protection from government infringements, 
making private data collection and use of that data the European 
Union’s primary focus of concern.300 
Pointing to divergent court decisions, the promulgation of 
conflicting state laws dealing with privacy, and pressure from 
international sources, advocates of a legislative fix to privacy 
concerns argue for a wholesale accounting and top-down approach 
to privacy protection law.301  As social networking sites mine 
terabytes of personal information concerning their users, advocates 
 
 295 See id. 
 296 Id. (“‘How do you assess whether there is a greater privacy protection or not (in 
Europe) . . . . To what extent do people have rights? It’s hard to measure.’” (quoting 
Daniel J. Solove)). 
 297 See, e.g., Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of 
Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Rotenberg, 
What Larry Doesn’t Get]; Marc Rotenberg, Privacy vs. Security? Privacy, HUFFINGTON 
POST, Nov. 9, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marc-rotenberg/privacy 
-vs-security-priva_b_71806.html [hereinafter Rotenberg, Privacy vs. Security]. 
 298 Sullivan, supra note 23 (comparing, in a chart, how E.U. and U.S. laws differ on 
privacy protection). 
 299 Id. 
 300 See id. 
 301 See supra notes 268–69 and accompanying text; see also Reidenberg, Restoring 
Americans’ Privacy, supra note 266, at 788. 
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of a strong federal approach to regulating these entities declare that 
the current immunities provided to Internet companies are too 
great to make any of the existing laws effective.302  The primary 
source of immunity for Internet hosts is § 230 immunity, which 
provides operators of an interactive website immunity from 
liability for content published on their site.303  Codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 230, the immunity provision essentially jettisons all 
potential claims a user of a social network might have against an 
operator of the site.304  Advocates of this approach argue that as 
social networking websites become more international in nature, 
the United States should be the guardian of its citizens’ data and 
privacy rights.305  By lacking a strong infrastructure, the United 
States is forcing its citizens to seek protection abroad and 
essentially feeding them to the interests that dominate the 
legislative process, computer companies with strong lobbies in 
Washington, D.C.306 
III. URGING SOCIAL NETWORKS TO REGULATE THEMSELVES 
The Internet has a strong tradition of self-regulation and letting 
consumer preferences correct perceived deficiencies in security.307  
As second generation social networks grow, the extent to which 
 
 302 See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52–53 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(immunizing The Drudge Report for comments made by a gossip columnist); Zeran v. 
Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (immunizing America Online for a 
defamatory post by a customer); Paul Festa, Decision Bolsters Online-Publisher 
Immunity, CNET NEWS, June 23, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/Decision-bolsters-online-
publisher-immunity/2100-1024_3-5245395.html. 
 303 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2006). 
 304 See id. But see Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1165 
(9th Cir. 2008) (refusing to immunize Roommates.com from an online posting that 
violated Federal Housing Authority and state laws). 
 305 See Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs, supra note 270, at 898; Reidenberg, Restoring 
Americans’ Privacy, supra note 266, at 771–72; see also Madsen et al., supra note 292; 
Rotenberg, Privacy v. Security, supra note 297; Rotenberg, What Larry Doesn’t Get, 
supra note 297. 
 306 See Facebook Agrees, supra note 281; Facebook, Privacy Improvements, supra note 
279. 
 307 Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs, supra note 270, at 877 (“The American legal system 
has generally rejected legal rights for data privacy and relies instead on market self-
regulation and the litigation process to establish norms of appropriate behavior in 
society.”). 
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companies control and use information should be determined by 
what their users require and demand.  Terms of use agreements 
require the notice and assent of their users in order to be effective 
and enforceable.  Courts should apply strict notice requirements for 
terms of use agreements but they should not innovate beyond 
traditional applications of privacy and contract law.  Privacy law 
has been devised and applied in a somewhat patchwork manner.308  
Rather than a comprehensive legislative approach to remedying 
consumer privacy concerns, the best course of action to prevent 
future breaches of privacy would be to foster a flexible market-
driven approach, based on the industry’s capacity to self-regulate. 
Social networking applications that abuse personal information 
for their own benefit (i.e., Facebook’s Beacon Program and 
RockYou’s password security) will fail while those that have a 
strong reputation for protecting privacy will attract customers and 
thrive.  Social networks that cooperate with each other and 
encourage self-regulation will benefit by earning a reputation for 
respecting user privacy.  Industry self-regulation does not mean 
that companies should simply protect the privacy of their own 
users.  Industry self-regulation requires second generation social 
networking sites (such as YingYang and Blippy), Facebook, and 
Google, among others, to take steps that actively foster an online 
environment where users can feel safe and secure by clearly 
defining their privacy policies, publicizing privacy breaches that 
occur on other sites, and banning information-sharing with sites 
that violate generally accepted privacy standards. 
Social networks need to take several actions to sufficiently 
safeguard their users’ information.  First, privacy policies need to 
be explicit and understandable to the layperson in order to create a 
clear and definable legal relationship between the user and the site.  
There have been sufficient changes within the last several years to 
standard privacy policies and terms of use agreements to anticipate 
that second generation social networks will protect PII according 
to users’ expectations.309  Start-up companies, such as YingYang 
 
 308 Id. (“Information privacy is protected through an amalgam of narrowly targeted 
rules.”). 
 309 Compare YingYang’s Privacy Policy, http://www.yingyang.com/privacy/ (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2010) (easily accessible and clearly articulated), with Facebook’s Privacy 
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and Friend Feed, have made their privacy policies easy to read and 
understand.  Bullet points highlighting the most important privacy 
provisions ensure informed consent by the user.  Further, 
limitations on what the company anticipates doing and is legally 
allowed to do with the user-supplied PII avoid the overly broad 
wording previously ruled invalid in Overstock.310 
Second, terms of use agreements need to be not only clearly 
written, but also need to specify how the social network interacts 
with APIs.  Terms of use agreements defining API use will be 
increasingly important as social networks begin to distribute and 
share information as sensitive as real-time locations and credit card 
purchases.  API’s, in particular, represent a fundamental challenge 
to traditional contract models, such as privity of contract and 
informed consent.  APIs, which distribute information across 
platforms and enable third party application developers to access 
information on a social network, have their own terms of use 
agreements, which are most often agreed to as an addendum to the 
primary network’s terms of use agreement.  Although complicated, 
the user should be presented with this terms of use agreement, and 
agreeing to the API’s terms of use should require more notice than 
is customarily presently. 
Third, in the wake of privacy violations, such as RockYou’s 
password debacle,311 the industry as a whole should respond by 
isolating the guilty site and ending cooperation with the site until 
the privacy breach has been remedied.  This should be standard 
industry practice.312  If a third-party developer is caught spamming 
or irresponsibly distributing information, all social networks 
should immediately cut them off, alert their users, and suspend 
communication with the site until the privacy problem not only has 
been addressed, but remedied. 
One example of a company that has embraced self-regulation 
successfully is Google.  Google has an understanding of its users’ 
 
Policy, supra note 20 (confusing to a layperson because it is littered with legalese and 
industry jargon). 
 310 See supra note 246 and accompanying text.  
 311 See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
 312 See Khare, supra note 18. 
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hopes and needs for transparency of use of their information.313  
First of all, Google anonymizes all of the information it collects 
about its users, so that in sharing the information across APIs, the 
information is not traceable to any specific or individual user.314  
Further, in November of 2009, Google launched a “Privacy 
Dashboard,” which contains a list of all of a user’s applications and 
allows the user to set his or her privacy preferences accordingly for 
each application.315  By allowing the user to control the flow of 
information, Google is attempting to assuage the fears of its users 
and earn the trust of the Internet community.316  By encrypting and 
anonymizing the information of its users, Google shields its users 
from intrusive and invasive use of their PII. 
Industry self-regulation has proven remarkably effective in 
remedying, clarifying and preventing privacy breaches.  In 
February 2010, Google launched Google Buzz, a new social 
networking tool integrated into its users’ email interface.317  Within 
one day of the launch, technology-focused blogs identified several 
features that jeopardized user privacy.318  Specifically, Google 
Buzz automatically found followers for users based on their 
contact lists.  These lists were, by default, made public, so other 
users could find out who their friends were emailing.319  
Theoretically, this feature endangered journalists with confidential 
sources and businesses with customer lists, as well as any other 
relationships that were intended to be private.320  Within four days, 
 
 313 See generally Google Privacy Center, http://www.google.com/privacy.html (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2010). 
 314 Id. 
 315 Erick Schonfeld, Google Gives You a Privacy Dashboard to Show Just How Much It 
Knows About You, TECHCRUNCH, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/11/05/ 
google-gives-you-a-privacy-dashboard-to-show-just-how-much-it-knows-about-you. 
 316 See id. 
 317 Matt McGee, Liveblogging the Google Buzz Launch, SEARCH ENGINE LAND, Feb. 9, 
2010, http://searchengineland.com/liveblogging-the-google-social-event-35702. 
 318 See, e.g., Nicholas Carlson, WARNING: Google Buzz Has a Huge Privacy Flaw, 
BUS. INSIDER, Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.businessinsider.com/warning-google-buzz-has-
a-huge-privacy-flaw-2010-2; Kashmir Hill, The Huge Privacy Flaw in Google Buzz (and 
How to Fix It), TRUESLANT, Feb. 10, 2010, http://trueslant.com/KashmirHill/2010/ 
02/10/the-huge-privacy-flaw-in-google-buzz-and-how-to-fix-it. 
 319 See Carlson, supra note 318.  
 320 See, e.g., Robin Wauters, Google Buzz Privacy Issues Have Real Life Implications, 
TECHCRUNCH, Feb. 12, 2010, http://techcrunch.com/2010/02/12/google-buzz-privacy/ 
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Google responded to the online furor by issuing an apology321 and 
modifying the problematic features.322  While critics will point to 
this situation as a failure of privacy law in America, it would have 
been nearly impossible to conceptualize and design anticipatory 
legislation for the innovation behind Google Buzz. 
The benefits of relying on self-regulation are consistent with 
both the Internet’s tradition and its future.  Second generation 
social networking start-ups, such as YingYang, Blippy, and 
Foursquare, grow, benefit, and thrive from the free exchange of 
information.  Collectors and traders of rare sneakers achieve a 
higher level of satisfaction when they can freely exchange price 
and availability information via a social network platform.  
Transparency is perhaps the key benefit of the Internet, and social 
networking sites enable and achieve a maximum flow of 
knowledge.  People benefit by giving YingYang their information, 
and YingYang benefits too by increasing advertising revenue.  
However, the amount and type of information the networks collect 
and their users divulge is becoming increasingly specialized, 
requiring a more clear and complete understanding of the extent of 
control the social network exercises over the information. 
As discussed above, in cases such as Harris323 and Specht,324 
courts have gone out of their way to provide users who regret 
giving up control of their personal information with relief.  These 
cases should be read as a common law approach to provide a 
 
?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Techcrunch+
%28TechCrunch%29. 
 321 Posting of Todd Jackson to The Official Gmail Blog, A New Buzz Start-up 
Experience Based on Your Feedback, http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/new-buzz-
start-up-experience-based-on.html (Feb. 13, 2010, 15:53 PST) (“We’ve heard your 
feedback loud and clear, and since we launched Google Buzz four days ago, we’ve been 
working around the clock to address the concerns you’ve raised.”); see also Thomas 
Claburn, Google Sorry About Buzz Privacy, INFO. WK., Feb. 16, 2010, 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/windows/security/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=2
22900563&subSection=Securityc. 
 322 Jason Kincaid, Google Buzz Abandons Auto-Following Amid Privacy Concerns, 
TECHCRUNCH, Feb. 13, 2010, http://techcrunch.com/2010/02/13/google-buzz-privacy-
update/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Techcr
unch+%28TechCrunch%29 (noting that Google “isn’t wasting any time in responding to 
user criticism” by modifying Google Buzz features).  
 323 See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 324 See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
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remedy for violations of privacy expectations in the absence of a 
legislative remedy.  Advocates of supplying such a legislative 
remedy ignore the rapid pace of social networking technology 
development.  Facebook is less than six years old and Twitter is 
less than three years old.  It would have been nearly impossible to 
expect that within a year or two of the iPhone 3G launch,325 there 
would be several hundred thousand people making use of location-
based social networking applications.  It is easier to envision a 
blanket prohibition on the misuse of personal information by social 
networks than it would be to implement such a regime.  Congress 
lacks the mechanisms to keep up with the pace of innovation 
online and the constantly developing methods of information-
sharing available to social networks. 
Rather than attempting to win an arms race against social 
networks, Congress should focus on codifying current common 
law regarding notice requirements of terms of use agreements.  
Providing a set of uniform procedures would enable greater 
predictability of the enforceability of terms of use agreements for 
both users and operators of social networks.  The industry should 
make common sense language standard for terms of use 
agreements, but this requirement should be instituted organically, 
not via a law.  Legal requirements for terms of use agreements 
should include posting the site’s privacy policy clearly.  There 
should be a requirement that the user scroll through the entire set 
of terms of use and affirmatively click-through the agreement or be 
required to type “I understand and I agree.”  By focusing on the 
procedures governing the establishment of the user-site operator 
relationship, Congress can ensure an informed decision-making 
process, while leaving the substance of the user-operator 
relationship subject to the terms of use agreement.  In defining a 
baseline set of procedures, Congress can effectively ensure notice 
for the user of the terms of use, while allowing companies 
themselves to battle for customers based upon the amount of 
privacy protection they provide. 
 
 325 Brandon Griggs, iPhone 3Gs Launch Has App Developers Seeing Gold, CNN.COM, 
June 19, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/06/19/iphone.3gs.launch/index.html. 
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The social networking industry is capable of resolving privacy 
concerns, but it needs to take certain steps quickly.  Second 
generation social networks need to act aggressively before 
Congress attempts to limit the kind or amount of information that 
users are allowed to share via social networks and to mitigate the 
uneven administration of justice by courts providing ad hoc 
remedies for vague privacy injuries.  The resolution of this debate 
will have dramatic consequences for the Internet, our domestic 
economy, and federal courts.  We are now in the infancy of social 
networking, proved by the limited duration of most networks and 
their accompanying sky-high valuations.  The time is ripe for the 
United States to determine its participation in social networking.  
Neither a strictly common-law approach nor a comprehensive 
legislative overhaul of privacy law sufficiently addresses the 
concerns of social network users.  Legislation should focus on 
fine-tuning the notice requirements of terms of use agreements.  
Any complete overhaul of privacy law will constantly lag behind 
the Internet community, and it will force traditional concepts of 
privacy rights to never completely square with the issues raised by 
social networking, particularly those that utilize location-based 
technology or other niche second generation social networks.  
Instead, the United States should provide a set of strict notice 
requirements for terms of use agreements, which will strengthen 
the world of online contracting and enable, rather than hinder, its 
citizenry the freedom to contract, use, and enjoy social networking. 
CONCLUSION 
Social networking, the ability for users to connect and share 
personal information over a privately owned Internet-based 
platform, raises a number of information privacy rights issues.  
Terms of use agreements dictate the amount of control users of 
social networks retain over the personal information they share 
with a social network.  Over the past several years, as social 
networking has taken a more central role in people’s lives, courts 
and legislatures have been attempting to regulate and remedy the 
privacy concerns and issues raised by the widespread use of 
networks such as Facebook and Twitter on their own, without 
clearly defined limits.  While privacy law has never been very 
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comprehensive in the United States, especially when compared to 
Europe, recent attempts to govern privacy on social networks have 
been particularly patchwork and confusing. Social networks need 
to proactively effectuate industry self-regulation to both avoid user 
anxiety and overreaching congressional legislation. Rather than 
attempt to reverse centuries of tradition in the privacy realm, 
Congress should provide social networks with a set of 
requirements for their terms of use agreements, including strict 
notice requirements, and encourage courts to apply these notice 
requirements rigorously, leaving the extent of ownership of 
personal information to contractual bargaining between the 
network and its users.  
 
